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Article 
Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil 
Union”/“Marriage” Distinction 
MARC R. POIRIER  
The Connecticut marriage equality case, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public 
Health, turns on a threshold determination that the state legislature’s distinction 
between “civil union” and “marriage” creates a cognizable injury of 
constitutional dimension.  The court’s short explanation of its conclusion hinges 
on two social facts.  First, “marriage” names a long-standing, complex, and 
revered social institution, while “civil union” is a new name with virtually no 
history.  Second, the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction is framed against a 
historical background of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination against gay 
men and lesbians.  The court’s explanation, while accurate, is all too brief.   
This Article elaborates some aspects of everyday naming practices involving 
social identity and kinship, in order to assist us in understanding the injury that 
comes from mandating two distinct names for the core family relationship.  It 
considers (1) the problem of family identity underlying Juliet’s “What’s in a 
name” soliloquy in William Shakespeare’s play Romeo and Juliet; (2) Louis 
Althusser’s concept of interpellation; (3) the feminist critique of language and 
names, focusing in particular on the “Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.” controversy; and (4) 
the way in which concrete, diffuse, everyday social practices of naming and 
recognition are multiscalar, and interact with larger legal and social structures 
around recognition, dominance, and subordination.  With these considerations in 
mind, it is easier to see that the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction has a 
cultural meaning that will create a stigmatic injury by reinforcing and activating 
dormant, dispersed sites of stereotyping and prejudice against gay men and 
lesbians.  Moreover, the distinction will reinforce a preexisting sense of second-
class status, which is arguably a violation of a broad version of a guarantee of 
dignity under a principle of equal protection.  The “civil union”/“marriage” 
distinction thus involves and facilitates name calling and identifying stigma—just 
as the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded. 
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Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil 
Union”/“Marriage” Distinction 
MARC R. POIRIER∗ 
[T]he question is nicely posed: what is there in legal 
marriage that is not exhausted by its legal consequences? 
Whatever that “x” factor is, precisely that is what separates 
legal marriage from civil union.  Civil union appears to 
withhold only the cultural symbol or power of marriage . . . .1 
[L]aw has the potential for either impeding or 
facilitating social change. Legal developments may impede 
social change by serving to rationalize and validate the 
perpetuation of unjust social practices.  On the other hand 
legal developments may reinforce ongoing social change, 
providing legitimacy for that change and influencing its 
future direction.2 
What’s in a name?3 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Partway through the Connecticut marriage equality litigation, Kerrigan 
v. State,4 the Connecticut legislature changed the game.  By enacting An 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.  I am grateful to my colleagues Tristin 
Green, Thomas Healy, Andrea McDowell, Michael Risinger, and Charles Sullivan for various 
thoughtful conversations on this topic, and to friends John Griffin, Steve Heyl, and Peter Riley as well.  
Naomi Cahn, Linda Fisher, Suzanne Kim, Lynn Wardle, and Jennifer Wriggins provided helpful 
responses to inquiries.  Tristin Green, Suzanne Kim, Nancy Levit, Michael Poreda, and Charles 
Sullivan provided helpful comments on a draft.  I thank my research assistants, Michael Poreda and 
Kate Riopel, and the Seton Hall Law library staff, especially Katie McCarthy and Jeanne O’Connor, for 
their agile research assistance.  I also benefitted from working with Brienne Henderson on her student 
note on the California marriage equality case and with Jack Tracy on his student note on the circuit 
split on state criminal law regulation of sex toys.  The opinions expressed herein are those of its author 
and not of his employer, Seton Hall University, the Catholic university in New Jersey. 
1 Katharine B. Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 189, 205 (2005). 
2 Kathryn L. Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 
1979 WIS. L. REV. 55, 63. 
3 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, line 43. 
4 Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006), rev’d, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public 
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).  One may choose to call the overall controversy one about 
“marriage equality” or “same-sex marriage.”  See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, “A Painful Process of 
Waiting”: The New York, Washington, New Jersey, and Maryland Dissenting Justices Understand that 
“Same-Sex Marriage” is Not What Same-Sex Couples Are Seeking, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 139, 143 
(2008) (“[T]he constant use of the term ‘same-sex marriage,’ by advocates and opponents alike, seems 
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Act Concerning Civil Unions (“the Civil Union Act” or “Act”),5 it 
provided legal recognition and purportedly equal rights, responsibilities, 
and benefits to committed same-sex couples.6  The Act introduced a new 
name, “civil union,” for its new legal recognition of a same-sex couple, 
and explicitly reserved the traditional name, “marriage,” for the union of 
one man and one woman.7  Thus what had begun in August 20048 as a 
lawsuit over Connecticut’s failure to provide any legal recognition for 
same-sex couples was transmuted into a lawsuit over nomenclature.  The 
question became whether providing legal recognition equivalent to 
traditional marriage, but recognition embedded in a new and different 
name, was constitutional as a matter of state constitutional law.9  
                                                                                                                          
to have convinced each majority and plurality that the plaintiffs were not seeking recognition of their 
fundamental right to marry, but instead were seeking a new fundamental right to ‘same-sex 
marriage.’”); id. at 145–50 (section entitled “The Importance of Language in Framing the Issue for 
Marriage Equality”; Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim within the Same-Sex Marriage 
Controversy, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 345 n.3 (2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Cultural Property] 
(discussing the terminological choice between “same-sex marriage” and “marriage equality”).  
“Marriage equality” seems to be on the whole more progressive, for reasons Barbara Cox, among 
others, illustrates; but all the same does not seem appropriate when describing traditionalist viewpoints 
on the controversy.  Moreover, “same-sex marriage” is by far the more used term at this point in time, 
at least in legal academic literature.  I will accordingly vary my usage in this essay according to 
context.  
5 An Act Concerning Civil Unions, Conn. Pub. Acts 05-10 (2005). 
6 Id. § 14, codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn, invalidated by Kerrigan v. Comm’r of 
Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (“Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, 
protections and responsibilities under law, whether derived from the general statutes, administrative 
regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to 
spouses in a marriage, which is defined as the union of one man and one woman.”).  A Connecticut 
Attorney General opinion held that civil union continues to be available after Kerrigan unless and until 
the legislature acts to the contrary, so the Act has not been invalidated altogether; rather, what has been 
invalidated is the compulsory distinction in name between same-sex and opposite-sex couples.  Conn. 
Op. Ag. No. 2008-019 (2008), available at 2008 WL 4760988.  Same-sex couples may choose to enter 
into civil union instead of marriage after Kerrigan. However, new Connecticut legislation 
implementing the Kerrigan decision amends Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-38nn to provide for merger of civil 
union into marriage, voluntarily or involuntarily, on October 10, 2010.  Conn. S.B. 899 § 10 (2009), 
2009 Conn. Pub. Acts 13. 
7 An Act Concerning Civil Unions, Conn. Pub. Acts 05-10 (2005). 
8 The Kerrigan lawsuit was filed in August 2004.  Kerrigan, 909 A.2d at 90. 
9 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 413 (stating that the issue posed after passage of the Act is “whether the 
civil union law and its prohibition against same sex marriage pass muster under the state 
constitution.”).  Instead of adding “civil union” and “civil union partner” systematically to many 
sections of the general statutes, the Civil Union Act provided that the terms “civil union partner” and 
“civil union” are to be understood as included in a number of traditional kinship terms relied on in 
Connecticut’s laws.  
Wherever in the general statutes the terms “spouse,” “family,” “immediate 
family,” “dependent,” “next of kin” or any other term that denotes the spousal 
relationship are used or defined, a party to a civil union shall be included in such use 
or definition, and wherever in the general statutes [with some specified exceptions] 
the term “marriage” is used or defined, a civil union shall be included in such use or 
definition. 
Conn. Pub. Acts 05-10, § 15, codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38oo.  Nevertheless, the Act 
establishes a distinct term for the relationship and for the partners in the relationship.  Section 15 
includes same-sex couples in various legal kinship terms only after Section 14 has separated and 
distinguished them.  “Civil union” is a different word from “marriage” and “part[y] to a civil union” is 
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Subsequent to the Act, the Kerrigan suit called for the Connecticut courts 
to consider separately the non-legal social and cultural benefits of the 
institution of marriage reflected in the name “marriage,” as well as whether 
the withholding of the term “marriage” in favor of a neologism, “civil 
union,” somehow communicated actionable stigma about same-sex 
couples.   
In a relatively brief but foundational part of its opinion, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that assigning 
a different name from “marriage” to legally recognized same-sex 
relationships did create a cognizable constitutional injury.10  It is to this 
part of the Kerrigan opinion that this Article turns its attention.  Finding 
constitutional injury in something as intangible as the legal adoption of a 
different name is a tricky business.  In fact it may plausibly seem like a 
“squabble”11 of significantly lesser dimension than the conferral of tangible 
benefits and responsibilities.12  This Article argues that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court was correct in its holding, and that moreover it has 
correctly identified the key factors that support that holding.  The new and 
unfamiliar legal name and status “civil union” will be interpreted against a 
backdrop of, on the one hand, the widely recognized name, socially central 
function, and elevated status of “marriage;” and on the other hand, the until 
recently pervasive and to some extent continuing social stigmatization of 
homosexuality.  
This conclusion merits a more careful description.  The fact that this is 
a controversy about the names for a central set of social identity categories 
is much of what makes the Kerrigan court’s decision on nomenclature 
correct.  The Act establishes and sets in motion different legal names for 
the purportedly legally equivalent familial relationships.  Names, 
especially names of this sort, are used repeatedly in everyday life in 
various social settings.  We use them to recognize and to sort.  Those who 
encounter a couple or even just one member of a couple must now ask, in 
various contexts, “Do I say ‘marriage’ or ‘civil union’?”  The imposition of 
this process of categorization and naming is not limited to the members of 
a same-sex couple themselves, but implicates all with whom they interact, 
indeed all who interact with any couple or family.  The Act thus sometimes 
                                                                                                                          
different from “spouse” and so on.  Id. at § 14. 
10 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 416–20.  The two dissenting opinions also found that a constitutional 
claim had been made, although for different reasons, with which the majority disagreed.  Id. at 484 
(Borden, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the plaintiffs had stated a constitutional claim); id. at 516 
(Zarella, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the plaintiffs had stated a constitutional claim); id. at 419 n.16 
(majority opinion) (responding to Justices Borden and Zarella). 
11 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (separate opinion of 
Sosman, J.). 
12 See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006) (“[P]laintiffs’ claimed right to the 
name of marriage is surely not the same now that equal rights and benefits must be conferred on 
committed same-sex couples.”). 
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requires, and effectively always legitimates, society-wide reliance on an 
underlying gay/straight distinction, and suggests that it be applied visibly 
and repeatedly in daily life.  The Act thus can reactivate, and will tend to 
reinforce rather than attenuate, longstanding subtle biases13 and 
unconscious distinctions around gay and lesbian couples and individuals; 
biases which persist even in the relatively tolerant society of Connecticut.  
These biases are more likely to be expressed to some extent in various 
harmful ways because of the mere process of repeatedly categorizing 
individuals in couples as gay or straight.  It is for these reasons that the 
legally-prescribed differentiated kinship names of “marriage” and “civil 
union” will produce the harm that Kerrigan correctly discerns.   
The tenor of this Article is theoretical, sociological, and feminist.  Its 
approach may not seem of immediate use in legal pleadings and opinions, 
as its categories and modes of analysis find no immediate correspondence 
in the terms used in constitutional doctrine.  And yet, exploring in some 
detail how an iterated differential legal naming of a central social 
institution can rise to the level of a constitutional injury is important as a 
pragmatic, political matter, as well as a theoretical and academic one.14  In 
states that are generally welcoming to LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transsexual, and Queer) folk,15 as individuals and as couples with their 
families, the question of differential naming of same-sex relationships is 
front and center.  In two of the states that have adopted “civil union” for 
same-sex couples, Vermont and New Jersey, state commissions have 
recently found that the term does not deliver the equality required by those 
states’ highest courts’ interpretations of their state constitutions.16  In April, 
                                                                                                                          
13 The term “subtle bias” is tricky, as it can be used in various, not altogether consistent ways. I 
have previously used it broadly to indicate various processes of discrimination that do not involve 
“invidious intent”.  Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL. J. 459, 467 (2003) [hereinafter Poirier, Cognitive Bias] 
(discussing “subtle bias”); see generally Symposium, Combating Subtle Discrimination in the 
Workplace, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003) (presenting various articles that use “subtle 
discrimination” in various ways). 
14 For an excellent argument that the task of legal academics differs from that of practitioners or 
advocates and yet, in its learned distance from the controversy at hand, may ultimately contribute 
importantly to understanding and progress, see Robert Leckey, Thick Instrumentalism and 
Comparative Constitutionalism: The Case of Gay Rights, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 425, 465–74 
(2009).  Leckey specifically argues that in the case of gay rights Kulturkampf issues, one role of the 
scholar is to elucidate the cultural and social underpinnings that inform any struggle around gender 
practices that is framed in constitutional terms, terms which may well be too thin adequately to account 
for the underlying issues at stake.  Id.  That is exactly the approach taken in this Article. 
15 I will tend to use this formulation (or alternatively GLBTQ) unless another is historically 
accurate (as for example when referring to a period when the terms bisexuals and transsexuals were not 
spoken, or when describing someone else’s position that is articulated in different terms).  The 
nominalization currently still seems to be “homosexuality.” 
16 NEW JERSEY CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION, THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, ECONOMIC & SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW 2 (Dec. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-Report-.pdf [hereinafter NEW JERSEY FINAL 
REPORT].  THE OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT COMMISSION ON FAMILY 
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2009, Vermont legislatively enacted a law recognizing “marriage” by 
same-sex couples.17  The New Jersey Final Report18 lays the groundwork 
for introduction of a “marriage” bill, probably this year,19 and may lead to 
a renewed state constitutional lawsuit in that state if the anticipated 
legislation fails.20  In addition to Vermont, so far in 2009 Connecticut has 
enacted legislation conforming to the Kerrigan decision, Maine has 
replaced its partial recognition “domestic partnership” statute with a 
“marriage” statute, and New Hampshire has replaced its 2008 full “civil 
union” status with “marriage” recognition.21  Legislative efforts in several 
other states are also underway or are planned.22  Then there is California, 
                                                                                                                          
RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION 26–27 (2008), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/ 
FamilyCommission/VCFRP_Report.pdf [hereinafter VERMONT 2008 REPORT].   
17 Vt. S.B. 115, 2009 Vt. Laws 3 (Apr. 7, 2009) (overriding gubernatorial veto) (effective Sept. 1, 
2009) (entitled “An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Promote Equality in Civil Marriage”); see 
Terri Hallenbeck, Same-Sex Couples Gain Full Marriage, THE BURLINGTON (VERMONT) FREE PRESS, 
Apr. 8, 2009, at A1.  
18 Supra note 16. 
19 See, e.g., George Amick, Jersey Should Follow Vt. Lead, THE TIMES OF TRENTON (N.J.), Apr. 
13, 2009 (discussing prospects for enactment of a New Jersey marriage equality bill in late 2009); Mary 
Fuchs, N.J. Gay Rights Advocates; Marriage Near, (NEWARK) STAR-LEDGER, May 7, 2009, at 27 
(describe expectations of New Jersey marriage equality advocates); Claire Heininger, Gay Marriage 
Could Become a Big Campaign Issue Next Year, (NEWARK) STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 11, 2008, at 27 
(describing plans for marriage equality legislation in New Jersey in 2009, as well as anticipated 
opposition to it). 
20 The theory would be that Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006), establishes a state 
constitutional requirement of equality and that the NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, provides 
strong evidence that this equality is simply not attainable through legal recognition via civil union.  See, 
e.g., Leslie Brody & John Reitmeyer, Same-Sex Marriage Fight Heats Up in N.J.; Decisions in Iowa, 
Vermont Spark Intense Debate, THE BERGEN (BERGEN COUNTY, N.J.) RECORD, Apr. 9, 2009 (quoting 
State Senator Ray Lesniak saying that if the legislature does not act to allow marriage for same-sex 
couples the state supreme court will); David S. Buckel, Lewis v. Harris: Essay on a Settled Question 
and an Open Question, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 221, 226 (2007) (arguing that the constitutionality of the 
New Jersey civil union bill “is open to be settled by the judiciary”).  Mr. Buckel argued Lewis v. Harris 
on behalf of plaintiffs.  
21 Conn. S.B. 899 (2009), 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts 13; Maine L.D. 1020, 2009 Me. Laws 82 (2009); 
N.H. H.B. No. 436 (2009), 2009 N.H. ch. 59; see Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Approves Same-
Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A19; Abby Goodnough, Maine Governor Signs Same-Sex 
Marriage Bill as Opponents Plan a ‘Veto’, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2000, at A21; Eric Moskowitz, N.H. 
Ties Gay-Marriage Knot: Revised Bill Assures Religious Protections, Boston Globe, June 4, 2009, at 
Metro Section, p. 1; Philip Shishkin, Maine Becomes Fifth State to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, WALL 
ST. J., May 7, 2009, at A4. 
22 Marriage equality bills are pending or contemplated in the District of Columbia, Illinois, 
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington State.  Minn. H.F. No. 
893, H.F. No. 1644, S.F. No. 120, S.F. No. 1210 (2009); N.Y. A.B. No. 7732, S.B. No. 4401 (2009); 
see Tom Barnes, Senator Pushes Bill to Allow Same-Sex Marriage, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 
28, 2009 (describing a marriage equality bill introduced in the Pennsylvania Senate); Tim Craig, Group 
Aims to Block D.C. Marriage Bill: Same-Sex Union Foes Seek Referendum, WASH. POST, May 28, 
2009 (describing plans for a District of Columbia marriage equality bill and plans by opponents for a 
preemptive referendum); Abby Goodnough, A Push Is On for Same-Sex Marriage Rights Across New 
England, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at 13 (listing six states with pending measures not expected to pass 
this year; presumably the author omits New Jersey because chances there for passage in 2009 are 
better); Jeremy W. Peters, Gay Marriage Slow to Draw an Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, at 
A1 (describing politics surrounding pending New York marriage equality bill); Jeremy W. Peters, 
Assembly Passes Gay Marriage Bill: Senate Fight Awaits, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at A24; Nikita 
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Stewart, Gay Marriage Fuels Debate Among D.C. Democrats, WASH. POST, May 21, 2009, at DZ1  
(District Councilmember David Catania plans to introduce marriage equality legislation in 2009); Amy 
Worden, Pa. Senate to Weigh Contrasting Measures on Gay Marriage, Phila. Inquirer, June 4, 2009, at 
B1 (a marriage equality bill has been introduced in the state Senate, and a mini-DOMA will be 
introduced).  Rhode Island will entertain marriage equality legislation in 2011. Goodnough, supra.  
Some states are facing or have recently faced legislation proposing to recognize same-sex couples 
legally under another name.  Hawaii H.B. No. 444, S.B. No. 457 (2009) (proposing civil union 
equivalent of marriage); Illinois H.B. 2234 (2009) (proposing civil union equivalent of marriage); 
Minn. H.F. No. 999 (2009) (proposing civil union equivalent of marriage); N.M. H.B. No. 21, S.B. No 
12 (2009) (proposing domestic partnership equivalent of marriage); Wash. S.B. No. 5688, 2009 Wash. 
ch. 521 (2009) (enacting domestic partnership equivalent of marriage); see Hawaii: Measure on Civil 
Union Dies in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at A20; Lornet Turnbull, Gregoire Expands Same-
Sex Partnerships, SEATTLE TIMES, May 18, 2009, available at  http://seattletimes. 
nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009233610_webdomestic18.html (describing signing of new full 
domestic partnership law, despite opposition).  Nevada should also be mentioned in this catalog of 
approaches to state recognition.  It recently adopted a “domestic partnership” statute that recognizes 
same-sex couples, conferring almost all the benefits and responsibilities of marriage, but not requiring 
employer payment of health benefits to domestic partners.  2009 NV S.B. 283, 2009 Nev. ch. 393; see 
Steve Friess, Nevada Partnership Bill Now Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A12; Ed Vogel & Molly 
Ball, Domestic Partnerships to be Law in Nevada, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, June 1, 2009, at A1. 
Nevada’s “domestic partnership” is emphatically not the legal equivalent of marriage, because that 
would violate a state constitutional mini-DOMA. Editorial, Domestic Partners, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-
JOURNAL, at B9 (discussing difference between Nevada “domestic partnership” law and recognition 
that would be prohibited under Nevada’s mini-DOMA); Vogel & Ball, supra (same)). 
Recognition of same-sex marriages valid elsewhere is another approach a jurisdiction may adopt, 
on its own merits, or as a stepping stone towards marriage equality via that jurisdiction’s own laws.  
The District of Columbia Council has just voted overwhelmingly to recognize same-sex marriages 
performed in other states.  D.C. Leg. Bill No. 10 (2009) (proposing to add 28 U.S.C. § 1287a, to 
recognize a marriage between a same-sex couple valid in another jurisdiction); see Tim Craig, D.C. 
Gay Marriage Measure Set for Mayor’s Signature, WASH. POST, May 5, 2009. But cf. Hamill R. 
Harris, U.S. House Members File Bill to Overturn Action by D.C. Council, WASH. POST, May 22, 2009, 
at B8 (members of the United States House of Representatives have introduced a bill to define marriage 
in the District of Columbia as between one man and one woman, in order to defeat the bill originating 
in the District that would recognize out-of-jurisdiction marriages).  A similar out-of-state marriage 
recognition approach may occur in Maryland.  Editorial, Rethinking Marriage, BALT. SUN, May 10, 
2009, at A24 (recommending recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages as a bridge to marriage 
equality in Maryland); Laura Smitherman, State Studies Gay Nuptuals; Gansler Explores Recognition 
of Marriages in Other States, BALT. SUN, May 30, 2009, at A1 (state attorney general is exploring the 
legality of recognition of out-of-state marriages in light of state statutory definition of marriage as one 
man and one woman).  Maryland currently has partial recognition of a smallish set of domestic partner 
rights and obligations.  See Smitherman, supra.  New York currently recognizes out-of-state marriages 
by same-sex couples, though this approach, adopted by the governor, county executives, and lower 
courts, is currently before the state’s highest court.  Lewis v. New York Dept. of Civil Service, 872 
N.Y.S. 2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2009), leave to appeal granted, -- N.E.2d --, 2009 WL 971444 
(N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (upholding recognition of valid out-of-state same-sex marriages of state 
employees under New York’s marriage recognition rule, and as a valid exercise of executive authority); 
Godfrey v. Spano, 871 N.Y.S. 2d 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2008), leave to appeal granted, -- 
N.E.2d --, 2009 WL 936963 (N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009) (upholding Westchester County executive order 
requiring recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages, as a valid exercise of executive authority and 
as a valid application of New York’s marriage recognition rule); Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 
N.Y.S. 2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dept. 2008), leave to appeal dismissed, 889 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y. 
2008)  (applying New York marriage recognition rule to valid out-of-state same-sex marriages); 
Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S. 2d 822 (N.Y. Sup. 2008) (upholding Governor Paterson’s May 14, 
2008, Executive Order requiring governmental agencies to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages, 
as a valid exercise of executive authority and as a valid application of New York’s marriage 
recognition rule); C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. 2008) (recognizing a Massachusetts 
same-sex marriage for purposes of divorce in New York); Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S. 2d 501 
(N.Y. Sup. 2008) (recognizing a Canadian same-sex marriage for purposes of divorce in New York). 
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where a constitutional holding requiring the legal recognition of same-sex 
couples through “marriage” rather than “domestic partnership” was 
reversed by an initiative, Proposition 8, which has recently survived a state 
constitutional challenge and is now the subject of a federal constitutional 
challenge; meanwhile the “domestic partnership” regime prevails, except 
as to 18,000 California same-sex “marriages,” which are valid as 
“marriages” because they were celebrated between the June 2008 effective 
date of the California Supreme Court decision and the November 2008 
initiative.23  Last but not least, President Obama’s agenda for LGBT civil 
                                                                                                                          
In a blog posting describing the current marriage equality strategy, Matt Coles, Director of the 
ACLU Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender & AIDS project, describes a focus on legislative action in 
eleven states.  Matt Coles, Iowa and Vermont: The Politics of It, Apr. 10, 2009, available at 
http://blog.aclu.org/2009/04/10/iowa-and-vermont-the-politics-of-it/; see also Goodnough (Apr. 5), 
supra, at 13 (describing momentum for marriage equality in New England in light of April 3, 2009, 
Iowa Supreme Court decision and then-pending Vermont legislative action).  Circumstances are 
changing so fast that parts of this post are already out of date. 
Same-sex relationship recognition legislation is always controversial and rarely a sure thing.  See, 
e.g., Marc Fisher, Opinions Vary on Same-Sex Marriage in D.C., WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2009 
(suburban edition) (describing action by District of Columbia council to recognize same-sex marriages 
valid elsewhere and discussing the politics of legalization of same-sex marriage in the District of 
Columbia); Tim Craig, D.C. Pledges Quick Review on Marriage Referendum, WASH. POST, May 29, 
2009, at B1 (discussing review of proposed popular referendum on District of  Columbia recognition of 
out-of-jurisdiction marriage, in light of limitation on referenda undermining the District’s Human 
Rights Act); Goodnough (May 7), supra note 21 (opponents of Maine marriage statute plan to attempt 
a constitutional amendment); Chris Grygiel, Foes Challenge Expanded Same-Sex Partner Rights, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 4, 2009, available at http://www.seattlepi. 
com/local/405838_domestic04.html?source=rss (describing a petition drive to repeal by referendum 
Washington State’s new all-but-in-name domestic partnership recognition of same-sex relationships); 
Harris, supra (describing bill in Congress that would reverse District of Columbia recognition of out-
of-jurisdiction same-sex marriages); Heininger, supra note 19 (describing political controversy over the 
anticipated marriage equality legislation in New Jersey); Rex W. Huppke & Monique Garcia, Illinois 
Gays Not Betting on Marriage: State’s Political Realities Steer Gays to Push for Civil Unions, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 14, 2009; Adam Nagourney, Same-Sex Marriage Holds Peril for G.O.P., 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A15 (discussing internal disagreement within the Republican party over 
the importance to voters of the same-sex marriage issue); Adam Nagourney, Signs G.O.P. Is Rethinking 
Stance on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A4; Jeremy W. Peters, Group Begins Ad Blitz 
Against Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A22 (describing planned ad blitz in New 
York by the National Organization for Marriage); Peters (May 20), supra (describing marriage politics 
in New York); Peters (May 13), supra (same); Jeremy W. Peters, Advocates on Both Sides Seek 
Momentum on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009 (assessing prospects for marriage 
equality legislation in New York and New Jersey); Shishkin, supra note 21 (describing anticipated 
attempt to amend Maine constitution in reaction to its new marriage equality statute); Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Gay Issues in View, Obama is Pressed to Engage, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A1; Turnbull, 
supra (describing plans for referendum in Washington State to overturn new full domestic partnership 
law); Karl Vick, “The Mormons Are Coming”: Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Trumpet the 
Church’s Work Against It, WASH. POST, May 29, 2009, at A3 (discussing political strategy around 
visibility of Mormon and Catholic opposition to marriage equality); Worden, supra (describing conflict 
in Pennsylvania Senate). Positions on same-sex marriage will also likely be a litmus test in upcoming 
judicial confirmation hearings, including Supreme Court nominations.  See Shailagh Murray, Gay-
Marriage Issue Awaits Court Pick: Same-Sex Unions Supplant Abortion As Social Priority for 
Conservatives, WASH. POST, May 17, 2009, at A1. 
23 Domestic Partner Rights & Responsibilities Act, 2003 Cal. Stat. 2586 (ch. 421), held 
unconstitutional, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), rev’d by referendum, Proposition 8, 
Nov. 2008, aff’d as to prospective effect, Strauss v. Horton, -- P.3d --, 2009 WL 1444594 (Cal. 2009) 
(affirming constitutionality of Proposition 8, but holding that the approximately 18,000 California 
 
 1434 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1425 
rights expressly includes achieving legal recognition for same-sex equality 
through “civil union,”24 but does not include “marriage.”25  A better 
understanding of how the differentiation of legal names for couples 
relationships delivers an ongoing cognizable harm will be helpful to the 
cause of marriage equality in all these arenas. 
This Article scrutinizes the two key issues articulated by the Kerrigan 
majority opinion as creating the cognizable though intangible harm.  First 
is differential recognition, in which an honored and central name, status, 
and identity (“marriage”) is withheld from one group while it is retained 
for another.  Second is the fact that the new name (“civil union”) is applied 
to a group (same-sex couples, as a proxy for gay men, lesbians, and 
bisexuals) that has suffered a long history of stigma and subordination and 
as such, the new term will be read and acted on in light of that history.   
The Kerrigan majority does not particularly acknowledge another 
intangible harm—the ongoing, repeated social non-recognition that comes 
from applying a brand-new name, “civil union,” to legal same-sex family 
relationships.  The facts are clear that the name “civil union” for same-sex 
couples and their families is often not recognized or understood, both in 
                                                                                                                          
marriages between same-sex couples that occurred between June and November, 2008, remain valid 
and recognized in California), federal challenge to Proposition 8 filed, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (N.D. 
Cal. May 22, 2009) (No. CV 09 2292) (challenging Proposition 8 as a matter of Due Process and Equal 
Protection, and also seeking a declaratory judgment that sections of the California Family Code 
declaring marriage to be between one man and one woman are unconstitutional); see, e.g., Matt Coles, 
Prop 8: Let’s Not Make The Same Mistake Next Time, available at http://gbge. 
aclu.org/content/view/604/76/ (analyzing the LGBTQ loss in Proposition 8 referendum); Geoffrey A. 
Fowler, Gay-Rights Outreach Grows in California, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2009, at A4 (describing plans 
of California marriage equality advocacy groups in light of anticipated defeat in the California Supreme 
Court on challenge to constitutionality of Proposition 8); Andrew Harmon & Neal Broverman, Legal 
Experts Concerned by Fed. Prop. 8 Case, ADVOCATE.COM, May 27, 2009, available at 
http://www.advocate.com/print_article_ektid86574.asp (describing opposition of LGBT leadership 
groups to federal court Proposition 8 lawsuit); Jesse McKinley & Rebecca Cathcart, Bush v. Gore Foes 
Join to Fight California Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A1 (describing federal 
lawsuit challenging Proposition 8 and dismay of LGBT advocacy groups at this departure from their 
preferred strategy of avoiding federal courts for the time being on the issue of marriage equality); Jesse 
McKinley, Proposition’s Opponents Say Fight Will Continue, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009 (describing 
LGB T advocacy groups’ plans for another referendum on “marriage” in California, in light of Strauss 
v. Horton); John Schwarz et al., Ruling Upholds California’s Ban on Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, May 
27, 2009, at A1 (describing Strauss v. Horton and reaction to it); John Schwarz & Jesse McKinley, 
Court Weighs Voters’ Will Against Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at A12 (describing oral 
arguments in Proposition 8 challenge litigation). 
24 The White House’s statement of the Civil Rights Agenda of President Barack Obama, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/civil_rights/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) (“Obama supports full 
civil unions that give same-sex couples legal rights and privileges equal to those of married couples.”); 
BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 222–23 (2006) (voicing support for legal recognition of 
same-sex couples via “civil union”).  
25 In fact, then candidate Obama wrote that he believes for religious reasons that marriage is 
between one man and one woman.  OBAMA, supra note 24, at 222–24 (stating candidate Obama’s 
religion-based opposition to recognizing same-sex couples legally through marriage, but also 
expressing his openness to continuing revelation on the issue); see also Stolberg, supra note 22 
(describing President Obama’s political dilemma on a number of LGBTQ issues, including relationship 
recognition).   
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everyday social interactions and, occasionally, in some service 
transactions,26 such as emergency room visits, where much more is at 
stake.  This risk of social non-recognition creates a constant annoyance, 
additional identity work,27 both in claiming recently-conferred legal rights 
and in establishing kinship identity to strangers, and it can risk great losses 
in emergencies where services are withheld because of non-recognition.  
So the mere unfamiliarity of the term “civil union” to the world at large is 
another plausible source of principally intangible injury.  Social non-
recognition is not however an injury that I will focus on here.28   
There is of course another significant type of non-recognition injury, 
deriving from the refusal of various legal jurisdictions to recognize “civil 
union” or similar marriage substitutes even though they are legal in the 
state in which they were celebrated.29  Whether such states would 
recognize a “marriage” of a same-sex couple as valid under the principle of 
lex loci celebrationis when they would not recognize a “civil union,” or 
whether on the contrary their public policy would prohibit that kind of 
recognition also,30 is an important question. To be sure, this kind of legal 
non-recognition harm, though tangible, may not be attributable to policies 
of the state of Connecticut at all, but rather to policies of other states when 
faced with a demand for recognition of a Connecticut “civil union.”31 
The Article also does not engage the question whether, assuming there 
is cognizable harm, it is of such dimension that the court should remedy it 
posthaste.  This is the issue that Kris Franklin has deftly identified as the 
“authoritative moment”—when a court, faced with a question involving 
recognition, has to decide the boundary of its authority to interpret queer 
                                                                                                                          
26 The term comes from Erving Goffman, The Interaction Order, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 14 (1983). 
27 The term comes from Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1259, 1262 (2000). 
28 I hope to explore the mostly intangible injuries from social non-recognition of civil unions 
separately, as part of an article in progress on information costs, identity claiming work, and kinship 
forms, tentatively entitled Identity Claiming Work, the Standardization of Kinship Forms, and the 
“Civil Union” / “Marriage” Distinction . 
29 The problem of interstate recognition of same-sex marriages has created a vigorous scholarly 
discussion.  See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES (2006); Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the 
Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433 (2005); Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and 
Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriages and Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and 
Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 87, 105–12 (2004); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of 
Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215 
(2005).  Thanks to Joanna Grossman for insisting on this point. 
30 As for example with the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738C (2009), and most 
states’ mini-DOMAs, depending on how they are applied to out-of-state same-sex marriages and 
marriage substitutes.   
31 Indeed, in the trial court opinion in Kerrigan, Judge Pittman acknowledged that this kind of 
recognition problem might create a real injury, but he held that it was not caused by the Civil Union 
Act but by other jurisdictions’ recognition policies.  Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 101 (Conn. Super. 
2006). 
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families.32  To some extent this question can be construed as a question of 
choice of remedy.33  Case law and secondary authorities differ on whether 
and when it is permissible for a court to defer imposing a constitutional 
remedy in order to permit the legislature to act.34  This issue is also beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides some background on 
the emergence of the term “civil union” and sets out the Kerrigan analysis 
of the claim of constitutional harm from legislating a different name for 
legal same-sex relationships.  Part III discusses family names and kinship 
                                                                                                                          
32 Kris Franklin, The “Authoritative Moment”: Exploring the Boundaries of Interpretation in the 
Recognition of Queer Families, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 655, 659 (2006). 
33 This is how Vermont Chief Justice Amestoy characterized the issue.  Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 
864, 886–88 (Vt. 1999) (discussing leaving the choice of the name used for legal recognition in terms 
of remedy); id. at 888 (specifically citing Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 101 (1996)); see also DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE 
138–44 (2004) (describing the disagreement between Chief Justice Amestoy and Justice Johnson in 
Baker v. State in terms of remedy); Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National 
Lessons from Vermont’s State Constitutional Case on Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
73, 99–104 (2001) (discussing the disagreement between Chief Justice Amestoy and Justice Johnson as 
to remedy in terms of concern for state constitutional processes). 
34 Compare, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886–88 (Vt. 1999) (permissible for court to defer 
remedy to allow legislature to consider alternatives) and Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221–24 (N.J. 
2006) (same), with Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 897–904 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (not permissible for 
court to defer remedy) and Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d at 230–31 (Poritz, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting) (same); see Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Foreword: State Constitutional Law Lecture: Pragmatic 
Constitutionalism—Reflections on State Constitutional Theory and Same-Sex Marriage Claims, 35 
RUTGERS L.J. 1249, 1249–51, 1255–56, 1259–60 (2004) (situating Baker v. State within a theory of 
“pragmatic constitutionalism” which recognizes that other, nonjudicial actors within a state also play a 
role in determining constitutional principles, and suggesting that a court deferring remedy as a matter 
of “constitutional strategy” may be especially appropriate in state constitutional cases); WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS150–53 (2002) 
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE] (arguing that judicial deferral of remedies for rights, such 
as occurred in Baker v. State, is sometimes justified as a short- to medium-term strategy for achieving 
longer term liberal equality goals); Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of 
Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15, 36 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions] (arguing that 
“[b]y bringing the legislature into the act, the Court [in Baker v. State] acted not so much as the dictator 
of a result, but as a catalyst for change”); Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue of Baker v. 
State, 25 VT. L. REV. 93, 97 (2000) (assessing Baker v. State in light of the passive virtues of the 
judiciary advocated by Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) and the decisional minimalism advocated by Cass Sunstein, The 
Supreme Court 1995 Term, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996)); Mae 
Kuykendall, Gay Marriages and Civil Unions: Democracy, The Judiciary and Discursive Space in 
Liberal Society, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1003, 1011–16 (2001) [hereinafter Kuykendall, Gay Marriages] 
(arguing that litigation over recognition of same-sex couples forces courts to employ a new vocabulary 
for family relationships, which in turn will shape the political and cultural discourse that will ultimately 
resolve recognition claims and nomenclature issues); Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: 
Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 874–76 (1999) (arguing that 
interpretation of state constitutions is far less text-centered than interpretation of the federal 
constitution, because of the interplay between judicial interpretation and political mobilization, and 
using state constitutional politics around gay rights and same-sex marriage recognition in Hawaii and 
Oregon as case studies); Williams, supra note 33, at 101–04 (identifying within the approach of Baker 
v. State strategic elements aimed at agenda setting and a legislative remedy); Kara M.L. Young, 
Comment, Prudent Use of Judicial Minimalism: Why Minimalism May Not Be Appropriate in the 
Context of Same-Sex Marriage, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 501 (2005) (arguing that judicial minimalism is 
not appropriate in certain contexts, and that the marriage equality controversy is one of them).  
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names and categories.  It provides several perspectives on why names for 
core kinship categories are so important, how they work, how they can 
recognize and foster changes in social structure, or on the contrary, 
stabilize social structures, standardize kinship forms and slow change.  One 
conclusion ultimately drawn here is that kinship category names, trivial as 
they may seem, have a considerable force and influence in everyday life, 
much like other kinds of names that have been the subject of scrutiny in 
recent decades.  Marriage-marking honorifics for women 
(“Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.”) will be the point of comparison, though gender 
markers on occupations, the role of gendered given names, the changing of 
surnames upon marriage, the conferral of paternal names on children, and 
so on would all be relevant.  All I seek to do here is to open up the 
understanding of why names such as “civil union”/“marriage” are so 
important, and perhaps suggest that several decades of feminist argument 
challenging unexamined naming practices would be more than a little 
relevant. 
Part IV re-engages the two social facts that led the Kerrigan majority 
to find a cognizable harm at stake.  The neologism “civil union” is likely to 
be read against a background of a long historical practice of stigmatizing 
gay men and lesbians, both singly and as couples.  This stigma bleeds 
through the supposed neutrality of the new name “civil union.”  In part this 
is for no other reason than because it is new and has no history of its own.  
Just as important, though, is the recognition that to deploy “civil union” 
and “marriage” properly requires everyone involved in interactions where 
these names are to be used to identify the couple as same- or different-sex.  
The mere fact of imposing a nomenclature distinction is problematic. Not 
only does the “civil union” distinction force partners in same-sex couples 
to come out as probably gay, lesbian, or bisexual over and over again, 
including in their interactions with strangers; but as a practical matter in 
daily life, the provision in the law for two different categories requires 
everyone involved in interactions with same-sex couples to affirmatively 
identify them over and over again as a same-sex couple, therefore probably 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual.  The law’s provision of a separate name serves to 
perpetuate microperformances and microidentifications of a historically 
stigmatized category.  It thus contributes to the likelihood that individually 
held cognitive stereotypes and prejudices will persist and be deployed.  
Reminding everyone that the couple is gay or lesbian will trigger 
stereotypical associations and consequent behaviors.35 
Part IV also briefly considers the argument that the reservation of the 
traditional term “marriage” for different-sex couples creates a stigmatic 
injury by elevating different-sex couples and thus implicitly excluding 
                                                                                                                          
35 See Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 450–58 (2007) 
(discussing the mechanism of stigmatic injury). 
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same-sex couples from an intangible but important recognition by the state.  
I view this as a different though related type of injury from implied stigma. 
Using the framework of  Kenneth Karst’s arguments about equal 
citizenship,36 one can identify a type of stigmatic harm that involves the 
state elevating one group and thereby symbolically subordinating other 
groups.37  An example that comes to mind involves some kinds of legal 
recognition of religion.  Karst understands that one problem with 
government endorsement of one religion is that it implicitly assigns 
adherents of other religions to a second-class status.38  This argument 
captures something important about the “civil union”/“marriage” 
distinction as well.  Even if not intended to be stigmatizing or demeaning, 
the naming distinction will be understood to acknowledge special and not 
so special citizens.  In an arena as important as marriage and family, 
perhaps this should not be permitted.  
Part V is a recapitulation, tying together the threads in my argument 
about how the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction necessarily amounts to 
name calling and identifying stigma.   
I follow here Greg Johnson’s recommendation to refer to “civil union” 
in the singular when discussing it as an institution,39 just as we refer to 
“marriage” in the singular when discussing the institution of marriage.  
Even if “civil union” turns out to come up short as an alternative to 
“marriage” for same-sex couples, we should avoid subtly slanting our 
discussion by treating “civil union” as no more than a collection of 
individual relationships that are undeserving of a name collectively as an 
alternative family institution.40 
This Article was drafted during the winter and spring of 2009, a period 
in which legal and political developments around the legal recognition of 
same-sex couples unfolded in the United States as rapidly as they ever 
have.  Its background discussion is current as of June 10, 2009. 
                                                                                                                          
36 See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1989) [hereinafter KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA]; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme 
Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1977) [hereinafter Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship]. 
37 See Healy, supra note 35, at 436–38 (noting how nonadherents of the government-endorsed 
religion are cast as “second-class citizens”); Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O’Connor and the Substance of 
Equal Citizenship, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 371 [hereinafter Karst, Justice O’Connor] 
(“[G]overnment’s message of exclusion is itself a stigmatic harm, and an unconstitutional denial of full 
membership in the community.”). 
38 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of 
Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 512 (1992) [hereinafter Karst, The First Amendment] 
(explaining that legal recognition of a particular religion inherently classifies followers of that religion 
as “insiders” and nonfollowers as “outsiders”). 
39 Greg Johnson, Civil Union, A Reappraisal, 30 VT. L. REV. 891, 906 (2006) [hereinafter 
Johnson, Reappraisal].  
40 Id.  
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II.  THE BACKGROUND OF “CIVIL UNION” AND THE KERRIGAN ANALYSIS 
OF THE CLAIM OF CONSTITUTIONALLY COGNIZABLE INJURY 
A.  The Background of “Civil Union”  
It might seem straightforward to begin by asking, “Where does ‘civil 
union’ come from?”  The answer at face value would be Vermont.41  
But first let us take an important detour. Where does marriage come 
from?  At once a more complex vista opens up.  Individual marriages are 
individual choices, at least in one sense—sometimes marriages are 
prompted by families, inter-couple bargains or exigencies, or other 
circumstances.  Marriage, however, is defined and regulated by the state, 
so there is a legal component, and as well a myriad of social expectations, 
sometimes themselves fixed in religious or cultural norms, sometimes 
more fluid.  Some persons of faith would go further, arguing (however 
inaccurately as a historical matter) that marriage is and always has been 
one way or another—relevantly to us, between one man and one woman—
that it is ordained by God, that it is a sacrament, and so on.  Without 
exploring all these avenues here, suffice it to say that marriage is rich, 
deep, and long as an institution, in our culture and in our history.  It comes 
from and goes to a lot of places. 
Now the question “Where does civil union come from?” and the 
response “It comes from Vermont” seem impoverished, almost pathetic.  
And I think in fact that may be a good part of the point. 
The term “civil union” was created by the Vermont legislature in 
response to the space left open by the marriage equality suit in Vermont, 
Baker v. State.42  That case focused on “[t]he legal benefits and protections 
flowing from a marriage license,”43 and expressly reserved for another day 
the question of whether “notwithstanding equal benefits and protections . . 
. the denial of a marriage license operates per se to deny constitutionally 
protected rights.”44  As to remedy, the Baker majority left it up to the 
legislature to decide whether to revise the state’s statutes to include same-
sex couples as married, or to provide some other institution that would 
afford same-sex couples the same legal benefits, as required by that state’s 
                                                                                                                          
41 See, e.g., David S. Buckel, Government Affixes a Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex Couples 
When It Imposes Civil Unions and Denies Access to Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 73, 75 (2005) 
(“In America, the concept of civil unions first took form in Vermont . . . .”).  The term “civil union” 
originated in France.  Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions, supra note 34, at 44. 
42 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
43 Id. at 884.  In fact the majority opinion recited a large catalog of the principal legal benefits.  
See id. at 883–84 (listing the many benefits and protections granted to persons holding a Vermont 
marriage license).  It simply did not address intangible cultural and social consequences that flow from 
married status. 
44 Id. at 886. 
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constitution.45  Justice Johnson dissented.46  Rather than give the legislature 
the leeway granted by the majority, Justice Johnson would have issued the 
requested injunction in order or provide an immediate remedy to the 
violation of the plaintiffs’ civil rights.47  She noted the issue of whether a 
separate institution with a different name conferring the same benefits 
would create an inferior status; but in view of her preferred remedy—
marriage for same-sex couples, and right away—she expressly did not 
discuss the issue in detail.48  The Vermont legislature in response, after a 
contentious debate, determined not to redefine marriage but to confer the 
constitutionally required rights, benefits, and responsibilities in a form with 
a new name—“civil union.”49   
Other terms for “marriage substitutes” for the legal recognition of 
same-sex couples had already surfaced, though their legal content was 
impoverished.  Municipalities began to recognize “domestic partnerships” 
legally in the 1980s.50  The term was also adopted in contractual parlance 
for human relations policies of private corporations, universities, and other 
employers.  Some states eventually adopted partial “domestic partnership” 
recognition, and in the years subsequent to the Vermont legislature’s action 
in 2000, some of those states used “domestic partnership” for a status 
practically equivalent to marriage.51  But the term “domestic partnership” 
                                                                                                                          
45 Id. at 886–87.  It noted the examples of “domestic partnership” and of some foreign 
jurisdictions’ “registered partnership.”  Id.  It did not include the term “civil union,” which had not yet 
been used. 
46 Id. at 897–904 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Johnson also 
offered an analysis of the issue presented as a straightforward matter of sex discrimination.  Id. at 904–
12. 
47 Id. at 898. 
48 Id. at 899 n.2. 
49 See generally ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 43–82 (describing the 
Vermont litigation and subsequent Vermont legislative deliberation); MOATS, supra note 33, at 142–44 
(describing the Vermont legislature’s deliberations); Michael Mello, For Today I’m Gay: The 
Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 166–242 (2000) (describing 
the Vermont legislature’s deliberations). 
50 See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 12–15 (summarizing the early history of 
domestic partnership ordinances); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, 
GENDER, AND THE LAW 1049 (2d ed. 2004) (same). 
51 Domestic Partner Rights & Responsibilities Act, 2003 Cal. Stat. 2586 (ch. 421), held 
unconstitutional, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), rev’d by referendum, Proposition 8, 
Nov. 2008, Proposition 8 aff’d as to prospective application, Strauss v.  Horton, -- P.3d --, 2009 WL 
1444594 (Cal. 2009), federal challenge to Proposition 8 filed, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (N.D. Cal. May 
22, 2009) (No. CV 09 2292) (challenging Proposition 8 as a matter of Due Process, Equal Protection, 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and also seeking a declaratory judgment that sections of the California Family 
code declaring marriage to be between one man and one woman are unconstitutional);  2007 Or. Laws 
ch. 99.  Washington State has had a more piecemeal version of “domestic partnership,” and only 
recently adopted a “domestic partnership” that is the full-fledged equivalent of “marriage.”  Wash. S.B. 
No. 5688 (2009), 2009 Wash. Laws ch. 521 (enacting domestic partnership equivalent of marriage). 
See generally Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The 
2003 California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and 
Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555 (2004); Turnbull, supra note 22.   
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seemed cold, clinical, and often it is misunderstood as a business 
relationship.52  The term “reciprocal beneficiary” was also already in use, 
having been created by the Hawaii legislature as a compromise offering a 
few of the benefits of marriage to couples who could not get married once 
the legislature was authorized by a state constitutional amendment to 
define marriage as between one man and one woman.53  The Vermont 
legislature chose a new term, “civil union.”54   
By the time of the superior court decision in Kerrigan in 2006, the 
nomenclature issue had already been addressed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts.55  That court required the state legislature to 
accord “marriage” to same-sex couples, not just “civil union,” a 
compromise proposed by the state senate.56  And during the pendency of 
the Kerrigan lawsuit, the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction was 
addressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.57  The New Jersey court, like 
                                                                                                                          
It should be noted that Colorado adopted a “designated beneficiary agreement” statute in April 
2009.  2009 Colo. H.B. 1260, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 107.  This law creates a checkoff list of some 
of the major benefits and responsibilities available to married couples and makes them available to 
unmarried couples, both opposite- and same-sex.  The agreement is recorded with the county clerk.  
There is thus no need to develop a whole set of legal documents addressing each right or obligation 
individually.  Moreover, each benefit/obligation can be selected or not, and the two partners need not 
adopt each benefit/obligation reciprocally.  See Nancy Polikoff, More on Colorado’s Designated 
Beneficiary Law, Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot. 
com/search/label/Colorado (discussing the Colorado designated beneficiary approach); Nancy Polikoff, 
The Extraordinary New Colorado Law. Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://beyondstraightandgay 
marriage.blogspot.com/2009/04/extraordinary-new-colorado-law.html (same).  
52 ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 61–63 (describing the deliberations of the 
House Vermont Judiciary Committee, including rejection of “civil accord” and “civil domestic 
partnership” in favor of “civil union”); Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions, supra note 34, at 43 & nn.159–
60 (arguing that “civil union” is a more dignified term than “domestic partnership” and citing to 
sources involved in the Vermont litigation and subsequent legislative deliberations); MOATS, supra 
note 33, at 197–98 (discussing deliberations of the Vermont House Judiciary Committee rejecting 
“domestic partnership” as demeaning and “civil accord” because it sounded like a car, and settling on 
“civil union”).   
53 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1 to -7; see ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 22–
25 (describing the politics that resulted in Hawaii’s reciprocal beneficiary statute instead of any of 
several other alternatives that were considered). 
54 In fact, Vermont also established a “reciprocal beneficiary” status in 2000, providing that two 
persons related by blood or adoption could establish a legal relationship resembling that of spouses in 
certain specified areas.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1301–1306.  This status survives; it is not addressed 
by the Vermont marriage equality law.  2009 Vt. Laws 3. 
55 See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (interpreting the 
holding of Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E. 941 (Mass. 2003), to require the legislature 
to provide marriage and not just a parallel institution, “civil union,” that might provide all the same 
legal benefits but under a different name, while reserving “marriage” for the union of one man and one 
woman). 
56 Id. at 571 (stating that the court in Goodridge considered not just the tangible benefits of 
marriage, but also “whether it was constitutional to create a separate class of citizens by status 
discrimination and withhold from that class the right to participate in the institution of civil marriage . . 
. . Maintaining a second-class citizen status for same-sex couples by excluding them from the 
institution of civil marriage is the constitutional infirmity at issue.” (emphasis in original)). 
57 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221–23 (N.J. 2006) (finding that at least at first it is the role 
of the legislature, and not the court, to determine whether to refer to same-sex relationships as 
“marriages” or “civil unions”).  The court stressed that as a general matter, it “will give . . . deference to 
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the court in Vermont, allowed the legislature to decide to create an 
alternate legal form, civil unions.  To a basically parallel extent, the 
California Supreme Court addressed California’s “domestic partnership” 
status during the pendency of Kerrigan.58  The California court however 
held that only “marriage,” and not “domestic partnership,” would satisfy 
the state constitution’s requirements.59  All three decisions—
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and California—were decided by four votes to 
three, as was Kerrigan.   
The Iowa Supreme Court recently required that same-sex couples be 
allowed to marry under the Iowa constitution, 7-0.60 Its opinion cursorily 
rejected a “civil union” alternative.61  This decision was handed down in 
2009, subsequent to the Kerrigan decision.    
In 2008, two state commissions weighed in on the “civil 
union”/“marriage” distinction.  In April 2008, the Vermont Commission on 
Family Recognition and Protection issued a final report after investigating 
the differences between civil union and marriage in place in Vermont.62  
While this commission was not charged with making a recommendation on 
                                                                                                                          
any legislative enactment unless it is unmistakably shown to run afoul of the constitution,” id. at 221, 
that “the State has no experience with a civil union construct”, id. at 221–22, and that the court “will 
not presume that a difference in name alone is of constitutional magnitude.”  Id. at 222.  This language 
can fairly be read to say that if a civil union construct is tried and shown not to deliver the equality 
required by the state constitution, the court may revisit the matter.   
58 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 (Cal. 2008) (“The question we must address is 
whether . . . the failure to designate the official relationship of same-sex couples as marriage violates 
the California Constitution.”).  The court at one point pointed out a few substantive differences between 
California marriage and California domestic partnership, but treated the two statuses as substantially 
similar nonetheless.  Id. at 416 n.24; see id. at 418 (comparing the California Domestic Partnership Act 
to California marriage). 
59 Only a relatively short part of the California opinion actually addresses the nomenclature issue.  
Compare id. at 434–35 (Part IV.B., explaining why the court need not address whether there is a 
fundamental right to have the name “marriage” available to same-sex couples, and indicating it would 
address the issue as an equal protection matter) and id. at 444–46 (Part V.C., exploring whether and 
how the difference in nomenclature imposes upon a fundamental right to equal dignity and respect in 
the official recognition of the family), with, e.g., id. at 419–34 (Part IV.A., addressing the fundamental 
right to marry under the California constitution) and id. at 435–44 (Parts V.A. and V.B., addressing 
whether the suspect class at issue should be characterized as sex or rather as sexual orientation and, if 
the latter, what standard of judicial scrutiny should result) and id. at 446–52 (Part V.D., considering 
whether the state’s interest is compelling and its method necessary).  Much of In re Marriage Cases 
thus seems aimed at established strict scrutiny for statutory distinctions based on sexual orientation and 
on characterizing the scope of a fundamental right to marry in a way that is important in contexts far 
beyond the narrow question of nomenclature. 
60 Varnum v. Brien, -- N.W.2d --, 2009 WL 874044 (Iowa Apr. 3, 2009).  
61 Id., 2009 WL 874044 at *29–*30 (considering briefly and rejecting the possibility of allowing 
the legislature to develop a recognition with a name other than marriage).  The court said, “A new 
distinction based on sexual orientation would be equally suspect and difficult to square with the 
principles of equal protection embodied in our constitution.”  Id. at *30.  It did not elaborate. 
62 VERMONT 2008 REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.  This report should not be confused with THE 
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT CIVIL UNION COMMISSION (2002), 
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/Final%20CURC%20Report%20for%202002.htm.  The 
2002 Report found that the civil union law was working as intended and effected compliance with 
Baker v. State.  Id.  
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whether to enact marriage of same-sex couples and declined to do so,63 it 
found that there were significant differences between civil union and 
marriage,64 and that a change in the law would remedy those differences to 
some extent.65  In April 2009 Vermont responded to this prompting and to 
general political pressure by amending its law to recognize marriages by 
same-sex couples.66  In December 2008, the New Jersey Civil Union 
Review Commission issued its Final Report.67  This commission found 
“that the separate categorization established by the Civil Union Act invites 
and encourages unequal treatment of same-sex couples and their 
children.”68 It unanimously recommended that the legislature expeditiously 
amend the state law to allow same-sex couples to marry.69   
B.  The Holding in Kerrigan on Cognizable Injury 
The trial court decision in Kerrigan v. State turned on there being no 
cognizable injury to same-sex couples from the new and different name 
“civil union,” so long as all the legal rights that the state could deliver had 
been conferred on same-sex couples.70  The trial court noted that after the 
passage of the Civil Union Act it was faced only with claims based on the 
“less tangible effects . . . of civil unions.”71  It listed these alleged injuries72 
separately from an earlier list of concrete injuries gleaned from the 
                                                                                                                          
63 VERMONT 2008 REPORT, supra note 16, at 28–29. 
64 See id. at 26 (noting the “significant differences between the benefits, privileges, and 
responsibilities attached to a civil union versus a heterosexual marriage”). 
[T]he Commission finds that . . . a change in the law [recognizing same-sex unions 
as marriages] would give access to the less tangible incidents of marriage, including 
its terminology (e.g. marriage, wedding, married, celebration, divorce), and its 
social, cultural and historical significance.  This also would likely enhance the 
portability of the underlying legal consequences of the status.  Further, providing 
statutory access to marriage would be a clearer and more direct statement of full 
equality by the state, a statement of full inclusion of its gay and lesbian residents in 
the bundle of rights, obligations, protections, and responsibilities flowing from the 
status of civil marriage. 
Id. at 27.   
65 Id. 
66 Vt. S.B. 115 (Apr. 7, 2009) (overriding gubernatorial veto) (effective Sept. 1, 2009) (entitled 
“An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Promote Equality in Civil Marriage”). 
67 NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16.  Though the Final Report was issued after the 
Kerrigan decision, an Interim Report from February 2008 was available at the time Kerrigan was 
decided.  It is appended to the Final Report.  Id. at Appendix A.  The California same-sex marriage 
decision cites the New Jersey Interim Report.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008). 
68 NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. 
69 Id. at 3. 
70 Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 94–101 (Conn. Super. 2006), rev’d, 957 A.2d. 407 (Conn. 
2008).  
71 Kerrigan, 909 A.2d at 96.  It pointedly noted that plaintiffs did not amend their complaint after 
enactment of the Civil Union Act.  Id. at 93. 
72 The effects alleged included a sense of unworthiness or inequality; a sense of second class 
status; humiliation; a feeling of being inferior and being demeaned; a lack of recognition by others; and 
a denial of the instant communication that “marriage” allows.  Id. at 94. 
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plaintiffs’ affidavits73—an implicit contrast of tangible and intangible 
injuries.  After examining several theories propounded by the plaintiffs,74 
the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted the 
state’s motion.75   
The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed.  It held that “the trial court 
improperly determined that the distinction between civil unions and 
marriage is constitutionally insignificant merely because a same sex couple 
who enters into a civil union enjoys the same legal rights as an opposite 
sex couple who enters into marriage.”76  It found, by a four to three 
majority, that there was a cognizable harm when the distinction between 
“civil union” and “marriage” was read “in light of the pernicious history of 
discrimination faced by gay men and lesbians, and because the institution 
of marriage carries with a status and significance that the newly created 
classification of civil unions does not embody . . . .”77  Let us call these the 
background of stigma and the distinction of status issues.  The court then 
proceeded to determine that the legislative distinction was based on sexual 
orientation,78 that it should be subject to heightened, intermediate 
scrutiny,79 and that the state “had failed to provide sufficient justification 
for excluding homosexual couples from the institution of marriage.”80  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the state and instead granted summary 
judgment to plaintiffs. 
The Kerrigan majority holding on cognizable injury81 is relatively 
brief, especially when one looks only to the court’s own language and 
pares away the quotations from other nomenclature cases,82 the quotations 
from the plaintiffs’ brief and an amicus brief,83 the quotation from Ronald 
Dworkin,84 and the lengthy footnote disagreeing with the dissents’ analyses 
of cognizable injury.85  Indeed, I ultimately find I have to rely on the 
reasoning in some of these quotations themselves to supplement some of 
                                                                                                                          
73 These included refusal of a hospital to allow one partner access to the other or designation as 
next of kin; denial of a home construction loan; inability of one partner to list the other as a dependant 
for purposes of employer-provided health insurance; and succession rights for basketball season tickets.  
Id. at 91.          
74 Id. at 96–101. 
75 Id. at 102. 
76 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 415. 
77 Id. at 412. 
78 Id. at 412; see id. at 431 n.24. 
79 Id. at 412; see id. at 431–76. 
80 Id. at 412; see id. at 476–81. 
81 Id. at 416–20. 
82 Id. at 417. 
83 Id. at 417 n.14 (quoting brief of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund); id. at 418 (quoting 
plaintiffs’ brief). 
84 Id. at 418 n.15 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REVIEW OF 
BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, at 24, 30). 
85 Id. at 419 n.16. 
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the court’s reasoning.   
The court’s explanation pretty much boils down to the consequences of 
the indisputable fact that the government has “singled out” a group, “gay 
persons,” for differential treatment.86  The legislature thus “declares them 
to be unworthy of the institution of marriage.”87  It has given this group “a 
lesser status,”88 a second-class citizen status.89  The court cites a 
Connecticut employment discrimination advertising case for the 
proposition that differential classification creates a real harm, even though 
it is symbolic and intangible harm.90  The court also invokes Brown v. 
Board of Education for the proposition that separate cannot be equal, at 
least when the distinction involves a politically disfavored or historically 
unpopular minority.91  The court notes that “[i] n such circumstances, the 
very existence of the classification gives credence to the perception that 
separate treatment is warranted for the same illegitimate reasons that gave 
rise to the past discrimination in the first place.”92  That’s about it for the 
reasons provided. Denying same-sex couples the right to marry effectively 
signals a continuing lesser status for gay persons as a group, which could 
fuel the perception that differential treatment of gay persons is warranted, 
even though similar past discrimination has been deemed illegitimate. 
I do not think this reasoning is wrong; but it is awfully terse.  And a 
great deal of the reasoning hinges on how one interprets the differential 
treatment of gay persons in the Act.  Here I think it becomes crucial that 
the issue is, in significant part, the legal name “marriage” (and associated 
ceremonial and kinship names) as compared to the legal name “civil 
union.”  And here the court says basically nothing.  It compares the two as 
institutions, without noticing that as those institutions operate in everyday 
life they depend on iterated instances of naming practices and related 
kinship-recognizing ceremonies to confer and reproduce relationships of 
identity, status, and kinship.  As I will develop, more focus on the name 
aspect of the distinction may help us better appreciate the correctness of 
                                                                                                                          
86 Id. at 416 (using the term “differential treatment” twice). 
87 Id. at 417. 
88 Id. at 419. 
89 Id. at 417 (quoting Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004)); id. at 418 
(quoting plaintiffs’ brief). 
90 Id. at 418 (citing Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 357 A.2d 498 (Conn. 
1975)).  Evening Sentinel involved a challenge to the newspaper’s practice of separating “help wanted” 
ads into jobs to men, for women, and for either.  Evening Sentinel, 357 A.2d at 501.  The Connecticut 
Supreme Court determined that this constituted “aiding and abetting” employment discrimination, 
which was prohibited under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act.  Evening Sentinel is not a 
constitutional case at all, let alone a “cognizable injury” case.  Nevertheless, in its focus on how 
practices of differential categorization can contribute to specific discriminatory practices, it turns out to 
be relevant, even though the Kerrigan did not expressly explore this dimension of Evening Sentinel.   
See infra Part IV.B.  
91 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008) (citing inter alia Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)). 
92 Id. at 419. 
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the result. 
The Kerrigan decision’s section on cognizable claim calls for several 
further comments.  To begin with, the court’s word “declares” is an 
overstatement, as the legislature did not, in the statute itself, “declare” in so 
many words that gay persons were unworthy of marriage.  It simply 
withheld the name (and thus also the identity and status) of marriage, 
creating a parallel but differently named institution, and it included other 
language about equality of rights and the equivalence of the different 
names.  As other sentences from the Kerrigan majority opinion make clear, 
the differential status is an inference, not a legislative declaration.  “[C]ivil 
unions are perceived to be inferior to marriage.”93  “[T]he very existence 
of the distinction gives credence to the perception that separate treatment is 
warranted . . . .”94  The operative question is not what the legislature said, 
or even what it intended, but what inference is to be drawn from the 
distinction created by the Act.  As New Jersey Chief Justice Poritz wrote, 
in a passage quoted by the Kerrigan majority, “the [s]tate declares that it is 
legitimate to differentiate between [the] commitments [of same-sex 
couples] and the commitments of heterosexual couples.”95  And as the 
California Supreme Court majority wrote, in a passage quoted by the 
Kerrigan majority, drawing this distinction “pose[s] a serious risk of 
denying the official family relationships of same-sex couples the equal 
dignity and respect that is a core element of the constitutional right to 
marry.”96  
In assessing how to interpret the Act’s distinction of nomenclature, the 
court notably does not rely on either legislative history or on the kind of 
fact-finding that Justice Borden, writing in dissent, thinks should be 
required.97  The court instead relies on two social facts:98 the vast, multiple, 
and unique importance of marriage as an institution,99 and the history of 
prejudice and discrimination against gay persons.100  In two respects then, 
the neologism “civil union” and the new institution civil union are read in 
the context of a particular history, tradition, and culture.  It is “the exalted 
status of marriage” that makes civil union, by comparison, interpretable as 
an “inferior” institution.101  It is “past discrimination”102 for “illegitimate 
                                                                                                                          
93 Id. at 418 (emphasis added). 
94 Id. at 419 (emphasis added). 
95 Id. at 417 (quoting Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 226 (N.J. 2006) (Poritz, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting)).  
96 Id. (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 434–35 (Cal. 2008)). 
97 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 484–86 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., 
dissenting). 
98 The term “social fact” actually comes from Justice Borden’s dissent.  Id. at 486. 
99 Id. at 416–18 & nn.14–15 (majority opinion). 
100 Id. at 417 (discussing prejudice on its own, and also cross-referencing Section V.A. of the 
opinion, concerning the history of persecution and disadvantage). 
101 Id. at 418. 
102 Id. at 419.  
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reasons”103 against a “politically unpopular or historically disfavored”104 
minority that triggers the conclusion that separate legal treatment now, 
standing alone, is constitutionally suspect.  Each of these background 
social facts actually gets considerable attention elsewhere in the opinion, 
which may help to account for the brevity of the cognizable injury section.   
Despite the “fundamental” and “basic” vocabulary deployed by the 
court when assessing traditional marriage, the court does not, as such, find 
a fundamental right to marry that extends to same-sex couples.105  
Ultimately its decision turns on equal protection analysis, not due 
process.106  Rather, the fundamental right discussion is put to work as part 
of an analysis about what is withheld in reserving the name “marriage” for 
opposite-sex couples. 
Judge Borden, writing in dissent, agrees that “there is enough of a 
difference between the new institution of civil union and the ancient 
institution of marriage to permit a constitutional challenge on equal 
protection grounds.”107  But he would put the plaintiffs to evidentiary 
proof, and disagrees with the majority conclusion that there can be no 
doubt that this difference is an established fact rather than a fact to be 
determined later in the case.108  He also points out that “civil union” is 
novel.109  He concludes: 
At this point in our history, however, and without any 
appropriate fact-finding on the issue, I am unable to say that 
[civil union] is widely considered to be less than or inferior to 
marriage, or that it does not bring with it the same social 
recognition as marriage.  It is simply too early to know this 
with any reasonable measure of certitude.110 
Thus, while the majority interprets the Act against a backdrop of a history 
of prejudice directed to GLBT folks, Justice Borden views civil union 
against a blank backdrop—there is no history to the term, and the history 
of treatment of GLBT people against which the novel term might be 
interpreted is not considered.   
Justice Borden also refers, more than once, to social flux around 
                                                                                                                          
103 Id. at 484–85 (Borden, J., dissenting). 
104 Id. at 418 (majority opinion). 
105 Contrast other opinions on nomenclature, which do find a fundamental right to marry that 
includes same-sex couples.  See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399–400 (Cal. 2008); Lewis 
v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 227–29 (N.J. 2006) (Poritz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
106 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 482 (holding that “equal protection principles” require that same-sex 
couples be permitted to marry). 
107 Id. at 483 (Borden, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 484–85.  He writes, “[T]o the extent that the perceived status of civil unions in this state 
is factual in nature, the majority has, by making findings regarding that status, exceeded this court’s 
power.” Id. at 485. 
109 Id. at 485–86. 
110 Id. at 486. 
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norms.111  He cites and quotes Baker v. State,112 which did leave the choice 
of remedy to the legislature, but expressly as a matter of remedy and even 
of political strategy—not because of lack of evidence as to harm.113  And 
Borden appears to overlook In re Marriage Cases114 and Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Public Health115 as interpreted in Opinion of the Justices.116  
These cases decided the nomenclature distinction question at the summary 
judgment stage, without fact-finding.  The majority responds to this point 
of Justice Borden’s about improper fact-finding by characterizing it as a 
“refusal to concede the obvious.”117  What is obvious to the majority is that 
a recently created institution—civil union—cannot possibly “embody the 
same status as an institution of such long-standing and overriding societal 
importance as marriage.”118 
The Connecticut Supreme Court also did not address some of the 
cognizable claim arguments decided the other way in the opinion below.  
The Connecticut Superior Court, per Judge Pittman, had noted that the 
plaintiffs sought to base their civil rights claims on a set of “rather less 
tangible effects of the status of civil unions.”119  These included (1) a claim 
of a fundamental right to marry under Connecticut law;120 (2) a claim of 
injury because civil union was a “lesser status . . . distinct from the more 
privileged status of marriage;”121 (3) an argument that “the statutory 
scheme is a form of ‘separate but equal’ segregation;”122 (4) a claim of 
injury because of “the unfamiliarity of civil unions in common social or 
legal currency, [such] that the plaintiffs must constantly explain their legal 
status to others;”123 and (5) injury caused by the lack of legal recognition in 
other jurisdictions of the unfamiliar status of civil union—so-called 
“portability” of the legal status.124  Holding that “[n]one of these [claims] 
rises to the level of legal harm required to declare judgment in [plaintiffs’] 
favor,”125 the court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment and 
                                                                                                                          
111 Id.; see also id. at 503–05 (comparing slow social change, legislative change, and judicially 
mandated change). 
112 Id. at 486–87 (quoting Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 888 (Vt. 1999)). 
113 Baker, 744 A.2d at 886–89. 
114 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
115 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
116 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
117 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 419 n.16 (Conn. 2008). 
118 Id.  Here and at an earlier point in this section of the opinion, the majority points out that most 
married couples would not exchange their marriage for a “civil union,” even with all the legal rights 
and benefits intact. Id. at 417 n.14, 419 n.16. 
119 Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 96 (Conn. Super. 2006).   
120 Id. at 96; see id. at 96–97(discussing this claim). 
121 Id. at 96; see id. at 97–98 (discussing this claim). 
122 Id. at 96; see id. at 98–100 (discussing this claim). 
123 Id. at 96; see id. at 100–01 (discussing this claim). 
124 Id. at 96; see id. at 101 (discussing this claim). 
125 Id. at 96.  As to the so-called “portability” issue (recognition of a Connecticut same-sex union 
in other jurisdictions), the lower court did concede that this particular injury from non-recognition was 
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dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.126     
The second and third of these claims—lesser status for civil unions and 
“separate but equal” segregation for gay persons—formed the core of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court’s analysis.  Its opinion did not separately 
address the fundamental right to marry, nor did it address the two non-
recognition injuries—unfamiliarity in everyday life, that is, social non-
recognition, and legal non-recognition. 
Justice Zarella also very briefly agreed that the plaintiffs had raised a 
cognizable claim, but thought that was so because civil union, having been 
created by statute, can be taken away, while marriage, as a fundamental 
right, may not, in his view, be repealed legislatively.127  The majority 
briefly rebutted this approach, essentially saying that it is speculative:128 
nothing suggests that the legislature intends to repeal the civil union law.129  
I think the majority has the better of this one. 
III.  OF NAMES, NAMING, AND IDENTITIES 
Much headway can be made in elaborating the concerns underlying the 
Kerrigan court’s reasoning on cognizable injury by considering several 
aspects of Thomas Healy’s fine account of stigmatic injury and federal 
standing130 (to be sure, Healy is talking about federal courts and Kerrigan 
is a state court decision) and Charles Lawrence’s project to foreground 
“cultural meaning” as central to the antidiscrimination project.131  If we 
                                                                                                                          
“real.”  Id. at 101.  But it was “not caused by the nomenclature used in the Connecticut legislation.”  Id.  
The court found that that injury was caused by other states’ non-recognition, not Connecticut’s 
nomenclature.  Id. (ruling on the portability problem as a cognizable injury).  Apparently Judge Pittman 
thought that the difference between a Connecticut “civil union” and a Connecticut “marriage” would 
not make a difference to other jurisdictions, a conclusion with which others have disagreed.  See  
ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 137 (speculating that a same-sex “marriage” might 
be more portable than a same-sex “civil union”); Henry Gottlieb, New Jersey Judge, Citing Comity, 
Grants Divorce to Gay Couple Married in Canada, 195:7 N.J.L.J, Feb. 16, 2009 (describing oral 
opinion in Hammond v. Hammond, No. FM-11-905-08 (N.J. Super. 2009), in which a family part judge 
granted a same-sex couple divorce from a Canadian marriage, even though New Jersey only recognizes 
civil unions, in order to assure that the New Jersey divorce would be recognized in jurisdictions that 
recognize  marriage by same-sex couples).  
126 The court also included a short section on the respective roles of legislature and judiciary, 
tipping its deferential hat to the legislature in matters of public policy.  Id. at 101–02. 
127 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 516 (2008) (Zarella, J. dissenting).  To the 
extent that Justice Zarella’s argument suggests, more or less explicitly, that it would be unconstitutional 
for the state legislature to redefine marriage by giving it a different name, he raises a most interesting 
issue, but one beyond the scope of this Article. 
128 Id. at 419 n.16 (majority opinion). 
129 Id. 
130 Healy, supra note 35. 
131 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious  
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, The Id, the Ego].  Lawrence has recently 
elaborated on ways in which this project was misunderstood and misapplied.  Charles Lawrence III, 
Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Origins and Impact of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931 (2008) [hereinafter Lawrence, Unconscious Racism] (explaining 
the origins and reception of Lawrence’s 1987 article).  
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supplement these with Kenneth Karst’s insights about the overarching 
constitutional value of inclusive equal citizenship,132 especially as applied 
to religious display cases under the Establishment Clause, we can better 
discern the underpinnings of the Kerrigan majority’s succinct argument on 
cognizable injury.  These authorities’ insights are brought to bear on the 
“civil union”/“marriage” distinction in Part IV.  First, however, we will 
benefit by considering that this particular injury is about which legal 
name(s) to authorize for use for a central social category.  This Part 
presents some insights that can be gleaned from focusing on names, 
identities, statuses, and the social processes in and through which they 
interact. 
As Elizabeth Emens writes, “Names are peculiarly situated as among 
our most trivial, and yet most foundational, social practices.”133  She is 
writing about proper names, and particularly about married women taking 
their husbands’ surnames, but her introductory observations are useful to 
us as well, as a catalog of some of the functions of names for people, 
including not just proper names but names related to kinship.  Names are 
“constitutive.”134  They may link us to families and kinship networks.135  
Having a name at all “is thought to be a fundamental element of identity 
and dignity.”136  Emens also notes, in the context of the gender-related 
naming practices she is exploring, that men keep the honorific prefix “Mr.” 
whether or not married, whereas women may be expected to change from 
“Miss” to “Mrs.”137  I will draw on this last example in a subsequent 
section, in order to illustrate the stakes in the “civil union”/“marriage” 
distinction and to note some of the strategies of resistance to legally 
changing kinship names, in terms of trivializing the work that names do.138 
A.  “What’s in a Name?” 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Sosman, in her separate 
opinion in Opinions of the Justices, characterizes the issue of the 
distinction between “civil union” and “marriage” as “a squabble over the 
name to be used”139 and “a pitched battle over who gets to use the ‘m’ 
                                                                                                                          
132 See, e.g., KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36; Karst, Justice O’Connor, supra 
note 37, Karst, The First Amendment, supra note 38; Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship, supra note 
36.  
133 Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital 
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 768 (2007). 
134 Id. at 769. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 769–70.  
138 See infra Part III.C. 
139 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (separate opinion of 
Sosman, J.).  
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word.”140  She cites to Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet for “[t]he 
insignificance of according a different name to the same thing . . . .”141  Her 
reading of the scene and the play is seriously wrong.  A correct reading 
will illuminate part of the stakes in names, especially family names and 
kinship names, and thus will help us with a better description of the stakes 
in the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction.  This is not to say that Justice 
Sosman is mistaken in identifying the question as whether a separate name 
for civil union rises to the level of a constitutional injury;142 but she cannot 
dismiss the dispute as “insignificant”143 just because it is about names.144   
In the famous balcony scene from Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, 
Juliet asks the question “What’s in a name?”  She continues, poetically, 
romantically: “What’s in a name? that which we call a rose, / By any other 
name would smell as sweet. / So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d, 
/ Retain that dear perfection which he owes / Without that title:—Romeo, 
doff thy name, / and for that name, which is no part of thee, / Take all 
myself.”145  The problem of course is that Romeo is a Montague and Juliet 
is a Capulet.  Those are not just the young lovers’ names, but also family 
names and identities, and those identities are themselves embedded in the 
society and history of the city-state of Verona.  The two families Montague 
and Capulet are sworn enemies.  The names may belong to Romeo and 
Juliet, among others, but the names also mark Romeo and Juliet and bind 
them to their families’ feud.  Romeo and Juliet are, thus, caught up against 
their wills because of who they are, as marked by their names.  The love 
between Romeo and Juliet is, thus, a forbidden love. 
Indeed, just a moment earlier in the balcony scene, Juliet has said “ 
                                                                                                                          
140 Id. 
141 Id. at n.1. 
142 See, e.g., id. at 572–73 (framing the issue in the case as one of whether reserving the name 
“marriage” for different sex couples even presents an issue of constitutional dimension); see also id. at 
581 (separate opinion of Cordy, J.) (“Assuming . . . . that a difference in statutory name would itself 
have to rest on a rational basis, I would withhold judgment until such time as the Legislature completed 
its deliberative process before concluding that there was or was not such a basis.”). 
143 Id. at 573 (separate opinion of Sosman, J.). 
144 New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Albin, in his majority opinion, also quotes the “what’s in a 
name” line, but writes that the question is “perplexing” and that “in the cultural clash over same-sex 
marriage, the word marriage itself—independent of the rights and benefits of marriage—has an 
evocative and important meaning to both parties.”  Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006).  He 
too concludes that the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction is not of constitutional dimension.  Id.  At 
least for the time being, though, his opinion is susceptible of allowing marriage equality advocates to 
return to the court if, in practice, civil union falls short of the underlying principle of equality 
established in the case.  That is, in fact, exactly what the New Jersey Civil Union Commission has just 
found.  NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1–3.  Failing a legislative response one may 
expect another marriage equality lawsuit in New Jersey. 
145 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, lines 43–49.  Some versions appear to 
have “a rose by any other word would smell as sweet.” (emphasis added). Compare THE WORKS OF 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, COMPLETE 1063, 1074 (Walter J. Black, Inc. 1944) (act 2, sc. 2, line 43) 
(“name”), with THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1114 (G. Blakemore Evans et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997) (act 
2, sc. 2, line 43) (“word”).  I leave this textual difference to Shakespeare scholars to sort out.  
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‘Tis but thy name that is my enemy. / Thou art thyself though, not a 
Montague. / What’s Montague? It is not hand, nor foot, / nor arm, nor face, 
nor any other part / Belonging to a man.  O be some other name!”146  Then 
comes the “What’s in a name?” part.  Interesting sequence: Juliet fancies 
Romeo to be no more than hand, foot, arm, face, and unspecified “other 
parts.”  (What parts? Think about it!)147  If that were all Romeo amounted 
to, he would then be free, or at least freer, to marry her.  But Romeo is no 
more just a body than a rose is just a smell.  He has a lineage.  “Montague” 
is not just a name, it is a family name.  “Montague” and “Capulet” identify 
who Romeo and Juliet are, their kin, their identity, and whom they may 
and may not marry.  To speak abstractly, the family names carry with them 
a whole set of entrenched behaviors and associations, calling up social 
relations and obligations, as recognized and reacted to by braggart kinsmen 
and meddlesome servants and friars.  The inherited tradition that makes up 
an undeniable part of Romeo’s identity and is called up and fixed by his 
name cannot be doffed, as he and Juliet would wish.148  It is not his alone.   
In Romeo and Juliet, the two young lovers do their best to escape their 
inherited family enmity, as marked and perpetuated by their names.  
Things go badly, through happenstance and misunderstanding, and in the 
end, they die.149  
B.  Interpellation: Names that Call Us 
Meanwhile, a very different tradition offers a similar perspective on 
the pervasive power of names, especially names that identify and 
reproduce social relations and the culture and history that those names 
                                                                                                                          
146 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 145, at act 2, sc. 2, lines 38–42.  
147 Actually, the more current and respected of the two versions of Romeo and Juliet that I 
consulted shows “nor any other parts” in brackets, suggesting some question about its authenticity; but 
the critical footnotes do not offer any explanation.  RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE, supra note 145, at 1114 
(act 2, sc. 2, line 41).  The two editions also exhibit some minor variations in punctuation. 
148 Earlier yet in the scene Juliet has said “O Romeo, Romeo!  Wherefore art thou Romeo? / Deny 
thy father and refuse thy name; / Or, if thou wilt not, be but sworn my love, / and I’ll no longer be a 
Capulet.”  SHAKESPEARE, supra note 145, at act 2, sc. 2, lines 33–36. 
149 Shakespeare often portrays young couples embroiled in confusions about who they are and 
whom they may marry, but these embroglios do not always end in tragedy. Cf. WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER’S TALE, acts 4 and 5.  The second half of this play turns in part on a 
struggle of young lovers to wed, seemingly against their names’ destiny.  Florizel, Prince of Bohemia, 
conceals his identity in order to woo and wed Perdita, whom he believes to be a simple village girl. His 
father King Polixenes discovers the plot and forbids the two ever to see one another again.  The couple 
flees to the court of King Leontes of Sicilia, pursued by Polixenes.  It is eventually revealed to all that 
Perdita (unbeknownst to her and everyone else) is actually the long-lost daughter of King Leontes; she 
survived abandonment in the wild as an infant.  Thus, Florizel’s attempt to marry Perdita by doffing his 
identity fails, but by happenstance Perdita is not what she seems.  Recovering her lost identity and her 
kingdom, her true identity now makes the young couple’s marriage fit and possible.  By the way, 
“perdita” is Latin for lost, in the feminine.  The discovery of Perdita’s true name and identity fulfills a 
prophecy that things will be set right only when what was lost is found.  Oh Shakespeare! 
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represent.  Louis Althusser, a fervent Marxist theorist,150 inquires how the 
relations of production are themselves reproduced, and focuses on ideology 
as that which keeps people in their social roles in ways that feed the 
processes of capitalism.151  As part of this inquiry, he introduces the useful 
concept of interpellation, or hailing.152  One need not partake of Marxist 
sentiment to appreciate the usefulness of Althusser’s concept. 
Althusser posits that individuals live within an ideology, that is, “a 
determinate (religious, ethical, etc.) representation of the world . . . .”153  
They cannot do otherwise.  “Ideology represents the imaginary relationship 
of individuals to their real conditions of existence.”154  Moreover, ideology 
is not freestanding in some abstract or ideal sense.  “Ideology has a 
material existence.”155  Althusser has previously identified a set of 
“Ideological State Apparatuses,” which include the religious, the 
educational, the family, the legal, the political, the trade union, the 
communications media, and the cultural.156  Using a different terminology 
than Althusser’s, we might well call these the principal non-governmental 
mechanisms and institutions of civil society.  The material aspects of 
ideology are manifested through these various apparatuses and their 
practices as individuals engage them.157 
Ideology sets up the attitudes of individual subjects through material 
practices.158  “The individual . . . behaves in such and such a way, adopts 
such and such a practical attitude, and . . . participates in certain regular 
practices which are those of the ideological apparatus . . . .”159  These 
practices take the form of everyday rituals—a mass, a funeral, a sports 
match, a school day, a political party meeting.160  The individual’s 
behavior, attitudes, and practices depend on ideological apparatuses, even 
though the individual believes that s/he “has in all consciousness freely 
chosen as a subject.”161  Ideology and individual practices are thus (my 
words) mutually dependent.  Althusser claims that “there is no practice 
except by and in an ideology”162 and at the same time that “there is no 
                                                                                                                          
150 See, e.g., Fredric Jameson, Introduction, in LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND 
OTHER ESSAYS vii, vii (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly Review Press 2001) (1971) (describing 
Althusser’s lifelong membership in the French Communist Party and his struggles within the party 
against Stalinist orthodoxy). 
151 ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation), in 
ALTHUSSER, supra note 150, at 85, 85, 89 (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly Review Press 2001) (1971).  
152 Id. at 117–20.  
153 Id. at 113. 
154 Id. at 109 (emphasis omitted).  This is Althusser’s statement of his first thesis in this essay. 
155 Id. at 112 (emphasis omitted).  This is Althusser’s statement of his second thesis in this essay. 
156 Id. at 96. 
157 Id. at 112–13. 
158 Id. at 113. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 114. 
161 Id. at 113. 
162 Id. at 115. 
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ideology except by the subject and for subjects.”163  Elsewhere in the essay 
he writes that ideology and individual subjects are “doubly speculary,”164 
meaning that ideology and individual subjects mirror one another and 
ensure and perpetuate each others’ functioning. 
“Interpellation” is a way of expressing the idea that individuals depend 
on ideology, which depends on them.  Althusser writes, “[i]deology 
[i]nterpellates [i]ndividuals as [s]ubjects.”165  The most familiar example of 
interpellation that Althusser provides is of someone turning around in 
response to a policeman shouting “Hey, you there!”166  This person thus 
becomes the subject who was addressed.167  He or she recognized that 
he/she was the person really hailed, and turned around.168 
Althusser’s example is sometimes misunderstood.  He himself 
immediately apologizes for presenting the hailing scenario as a temporal 
sequence—walking, hailing, turning.169  “[I]n reality these things happen 
without any succession.  The existence of ideology and the hailing . . . of 
individuals as subjects are one and the same thing.”170  As a consequence, 
Althusser insists that “ideology has always-already interpellated 
individuals as subjects.”171   
This perhaps jargony formulation is illustrated by an example whose 
relevance to our topic may be clear, as it involves inherited family 
ideologies and structures.  Althusser notes  
the ideological ritual that surrounds the expectation of a 
“birth” . . . . Everyone knows how much and in what way an 
unborn child is expected . . . . Before its birth, the child is . . .    
always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the 
specific familial ideological configuration in which it is 
“expected” once it has been conceived . . . [T]his familial 
ideological configuration is, in its uniqueness, highly 
structured . . . . [I]t is in this implacable and more or less 
“pathological” . . . structure that the former subject-to-be will 
have to “find” “its” place, i.e., “become” the sexual subject 
(boy or girl) which it already is in advance.172 
We will return in a moment to this characterization of family and gender 
                                                                                                                          
163 Id.  Althusser calls this a process of “double constitution,” in which individuals constitute 
ideology even as ideology constitutes individual subjects.  Id. at 116. 
164 Id. at 122 (emphasis omitted). 
165 Id. at 115 (emphasis omitted). 





171 Id. at 119. 
172 Id.. 
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structure in particular as already-given and implacable.  For the moment let 
us notice just the idea that we are inevitably born into social structures, 
which shape our view of ourselves and our culture and world. 
Another potential mishap, perhaps, with Althusser’s policeman hailing 
example is that it involves police.  In a footnote, Althusser points out that 
the societal practice of police hailing of suspects “takes a quite ‘special’ 
form . . . .”173  Thus it is not, in respect of its involving a policeman, a 
generalizable example.  Because the hailer is given concrete form as a 
policeman, the process of interpellation can be misunderstood as limited to 
state actors, or as involving the threat of the exercise of force by some 
legal authority.  This is not accurate.  Althusser’s cataloguing of 
Ideological State Apparatuses is expressly not about the state as a separate 
and partial force.  Althusser is investigating the pervasive operation of 
ideology throughout society.  Moreover, Althusser argues that the legal 
system is special; it occupies a dual position, both as what he calls a 
“Repressive State Apparatus” that depends principally on violence, and as 
an “Ideological State Apparatus” that depends primarily on ideology for its 
functioning.174  Althusser expressly locates the functioning of the legal 
system in both the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State 
Apparatus.175  The basic mechanism in the hailing and turning process is a 
recognition each of the other, expressed in action, that constitutes subjects 
within a social framework. It is ideological and does not depend on the 
threat of violence. 
Fredric Jameson offers a succinct summary of interpellation and of its 
implications for social change in the direction of social justice.  
Interpellation is 
the way in which the social order speaks to us as individuals 
and as it were calls us by name.  It can best be understood as 
the system of roles and social positions contained in the 
impersonal and collective Symbolic Order: the latter 
furnishes us the options available in our social and historical 
moment.176 
Our social and historical order, contingent as it is, furnishes us our options.  
But we do have a choice, according to Jameson.   
We can simply adopt one of these, or we can refuse them all 
in revolt; or finally we can attempt to invent new ones, for 
which our society has not yet provided.  The constraints of 
interpellation are simply the possibilities or our own 
                                                                                                                          
173 Id. at 118 n.18. 
174 Id. at 97–98. 
175 Id. at 90, 96. 
176 Jameson, supra note 150, at xiv. 
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historical situation, the hand we have been dealt by history, 
the terms with which we must work.177 
José Gabilondo also provides a useful, succinct summary of 
interpellation.  “In general, interpellation is the notion that systems of ideas 
are the medium through which a person finds one’s sense of self and 
comes to recognize oneself as an emotionally and politically sentient 
subject.”178  Like Jameson, Gabilondo finds within the broad concept of 
interpellation room to maneuver.  He describes “interpellative advocacy,” a 
goal of “coming to speech,” as part of a certain homosexual political and 
cultural project.179  Gabilondo thus proposes conceiving of certain kinds of 
cultural and legal moves in support of homosexual recognition and respect 
as interventions in processes of interpellation. 
Althusser’s presentation of interpellation suggests a special relevance 
of the concept to consideration of the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction.  
The process of naming and turning is about recognition.  Family structures 
and rituals, and indeed specifically gendered family structures, may be 
paradigmatic examples of the background processes against which new 
forms of individual and collective identity must work to emerge and 
achieve recognition.  I will spend a moment more here on ideas of family 
and recognition as glimpsed in the Althusser essay, as well as on a third 
topic—the sense of timelessness, obviousness, and naturalness generated 
by ideological operations of interpellation. 
As to family, I have just quoted portions of the most extended 
treatment in Althusser’s essay.  At the moment it is conceived, the as-yet-
unborn child is already subject to ideological ritual and expectation.  The 
specific form imposed may vary historically and culturally,180 but central 
characteristics of the child’s identity are always predetermined one way or 
another.  This is hardly an exceptionable or solely Marxist point.  In a very 
different idiom, for example, Charles Taylor argues that human life is 
fundamentally dialogical in character.181  We must acquire language and 
other modes of expression by which we define ourselves through 
exchanges with others.182  This fact is true at the beginning of our lives, 
and continues throughout our lives.183  Taylor’s formulation tends more to 
                                                                                                                          
177 Id. 
178 José Gabilondo, Asking the Straight Question: How to Come to Speech in Spite of Conceptual 
Liquidation as a Homosexual, 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2–3 (2006). 
179 Id. at 3 (referring to DIDIER ERIBON, INSULT AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY SELF 9 (Michael 
Lucey trans., 2004) (1994)). 
180 Althusser says that we can set aside the specifics of the forms for family ideology—there will 
always be one or another to assign the child an identity.  ALTHUSSER, supra note 150, at 119. 
181 Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE 
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 32 (Amy Guttman ed., 1994). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 32–33. 
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the possibility of individual negotiation and change than Althusser’s, 
though I think Jameson’s and Gabilondo’s versions of interpellation also 
do suggest the possibility of change.  But change must occur against a 
background ideology that is determined by others and inherited. 
Althusser’s account also recognizes that the family serves multiple 
functions, being at one and the same time a source of ideology, a source of 
labor power, and a focus of consumption.184  Again this is hardly 
exceptionable.  The family is also a principal source and an important 
locus of the functioning of sex/gender identity.185  As Judith Butler has 
written, the infant is “brought into the domain of language and kinship 
through the interpellation of gender.”186 
As to recognition, interpellation is clearly an ongoing process of 
mutual and mutually reinforcing recognitions.  Again the police hailing 
example, while it does contain mutual recognition, could be misleading.  It 
could be read as unidirectional.  Althusser provides other examples.  One is 
of recognizing a friend through a door (the knock, the voice saying “It’s 
me.”, and then the door opening so that recognition is confirmed).187 
Another is of recognizing a previous acquaintance and demonstrating that 
recognition with “material ritual practice[s] of ideological recognition in 
everyday life”—in France a greeting and a handshake.188  The practice of 
recognition is “incessant,”189 mutual (if not necessarily symmetrical),190 
and occurs through “concrete” and “everyday life” “practices” and 
“practical rituals.”191  Using my terminology, I might say that 
interpellation, insofar as it consists of material practices and rituals, is very 
often about microinteractions in which microperformances are interpreted 
in mutually reinforcing ways. 
Another set of characteristics that Althusser notes concerning 
interpellation, and which I wish to mention here, involves obviousness, 
naturalness, and timelessness.  These characteristics describe what I would 
call the phenomenology of interpellation.  This discussion could take us far 
afield, but it is necessary, because these characteristics are highly relevant 
to the marriage controversy, and in particular, to the evident resistance to 
changing the name of marriage or its opposite-sex defining characteristic.  
                                                                                                                          
184 ALTHUSSER, supra note 151, at 96 & n.8. 
185 Id. at 119 (discussing how the unborn child will have to become the sexual subject, boy or 
girl). 
186 JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF SEX 7 (1993).  As 
Butler notes, the “founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and a various intervals of 
time” and is thus “the repeated inculcation of a norm.”  Id. at 7–8.  
187 ALTHUSSER, supra note 151, at 117. 
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Many traditionalists perceive marriage as obvious, natural, and timeless, 
and therefore not legitimately subject to processes of social change or to 
legislative or judicial redefinition. 
Althusser writes, “It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes . 
. . obviousnesses as obviousnesses, which we cannot fail to recognize and 
for which we have the inevitable and natural reaction of crying out (aloud 
or in the ‘still, small voice of conscience’): ‘That’s obvious! That’s right! 
That’s true.’”192  Much of the recognition involved in interpellation is 
transparent, and not in a good sense.  It is the transparency that Barbara 
Flagg questions in her critique of transparently white decisionmaking, for 
example.193  It is the obviousness that Sandra Bem identifies as one of the 
three lenses of gender—naturalness or, as she sometimes calls it, 
essentialization.194  In a sense, the obviousness or naturalness of many 
everyday experiences of recognition can lead the subject to misunderstand 
what is going on as fixed and natural, rather than as speculary and in some 
important sense contingently (re)produced.  When that sense of 
obviousness and naturalness sets in, an attempt to question or change the 
microprocesses will be resisted as confusing, non-obvious, and unnatural.   
Althusser, in exploring an extended example of interpellation, not 
coincidentally uses a particular version of Christianity as his example.195  
The eternal, universal, timeless claims offered by the version of 
Christianity that Althusser describes are reflected in some traditionalists’ 
similar rhetoric (that is, that one-man-one-woman marriage is timeless and 
is ordained by God) directed specifically at the slow revolution in 
legislative or judicial redefinition of marriage.196  But discussion of the 
                                                                                                                          
192 Id. at 116. 
193 Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective 
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2029 (1995) (arguing that expectations around workplace 
behavior are culturally conditioned to express and reproduce white norms in a way that whites are 
unaware of, in other words, that is transparent to them). 
194 SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL 
INEQUALITY 2–3, 6–38 (1993).  The other two lenses Bem identifies are gender polarization and 
androcentrism, that is, favoring men over women.  Id. at 2–3.  See generally Marc R. Poirier, Hastening 
the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 LAW & 
SEXUALITY 271, 303–06 (2003) [hereinafter Poirier, Hastening] (discussing generally and with 
reference to Bem the political consequences of de-essentializing gender).  
195 ALTHUSSER, supra note 151, at 120–22. 
196 Some traditionalists might welcome a sufficiently slow “slow revolution” of law as the 
recognition of a Burkean evolution of custom.  See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Not Whether But How: Gay 
Marriage and the Revival of Burkean Conservatism, 50 SO. TEX. L. REV. 1 (2008).  In Rauch’s 
analysis, once the same-sex marriage issue became salient, both the political left advocating marriage 
equality and the traditionalist and religious right opportunistically took maximalist positions that either 
pushed for rapid change or sought to foreclose all change.  Id. at 9–10.  Rauch’s version of Burkeanism 
would favor incrementalism in the recognition of gay marriage, with civil union an important 
intermediate step.  Id. at 11–12.  See also Amy L. Wax, The Conservative’s Dilemma: Traditional 
Institutions, Social Change, and Same-Sex Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1059 (2005).  Wax asks 
whether conservatives should resist same-sex marriage.  Id. at 1097.  Referring in part to a book-length 
argument by Jonathan Rauch, id. at 1098–1103 and to the indisputable fact that forms of family life are 
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way that religion sometimes, as a type of ideology, naturalizes and 
stabilizes currently existing social structures, takes us too far afield from 
the topic of the Article, and must await another occasion. 
C.  Introducing New Names into Practice 
Thus far in our consideration of names and identities, we have 
examined inherited family names and the way in which they fixed the 
identities of Romeo and Juliet; and a general theory of interpellation in 
which inherited language, culture, and other social structures call out to 
and in part fix, indeed establish, individual subjects, even as those subjects 
produce the rituals and practices that establish them.  Although we 
eventually will circle back towards the topic of this Article—the harm in 
establishing the name “civil union” as compared to the name “marriage” 
—I want to explore briefly here another theme that will also shed some 
light on the stakes in the name distinction.  That is the attempt to alter 
identity-conferring and -confirming names (that is, one category of names 
that interpellate) by replacing them.  Where the names are not family 
names (e.g., Montague and Capulet) but words and customs used in a 
particular language for identities and social structures, an act of 
“interpellative advocacy”197 that attempts to change the implications of 
identity often involves seeking to introduce new names into a very 
widespread everyday practice.  This is not so easy to do; one cannot 
change a language, or any other widespread and diffuse social practice, by 
simple fiat.198  And yet when addressing a stigma or subordination that is 
produced and maintained in part by naming practices, the activity of name 
changing may be called for. 
One kind of name-changing process might involve seeking to erase 
and replace stigmatizing names for subordinated groups.  “Nigger” goes to 
“Negro” goes to “Afro-American” goes to “black” goes to “Black” goes to 
“African American.”  “Faggot/fairy/dyke” goes to “homosexual” goes to 
“gay and lesbian” goes perhaps to “queer” and perhaps also to mentioning 
“bisexual” and “transgender” instead of erasing them.199  There are other 
                                                                                                                          
changing, id. at 1101–03, Wax concludes that the answer remains elusive.  Id. at 1103 (discussing 
JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD 
FOR AMERICA (2004)).   
197 Gabilondo, supra note 178, at 3.  
198 Robin Tolmach Lakoff, Language and Woman’s Place, in ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, 
LANGUAGE AND WOMAN’S PLACE: TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 29, 68 (Mary Bucholtz ed., rev. & 
expanded ed. 2004) (reproducing with commentaries Robin Lakoff’s important 1975 book Language 
and Women’s Place) (“[S]ocial change must precede lexical change: woman must achieve some 
measure of greater social independence of men before Ms. can gain wider acceptance.”). 
199 For an account of several such attempts to engineer social positioning through changing the 
names for stigmatized groups, see Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and 
Status in Family Law, 85 INDIANA L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
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examples.  These processes are complex and occur on many levels, just as 
does the feminist name- and word-replacing project I will consider in this 
subpart.  In each individual interaction that might call for the old name, 
once the participant(s) are aware of their new choices, they will have to 
consider more deliberately what name to use.  They will have to stop and 
think.  Indeed, for those seeking to get the naming practice changed, part of 
the purpose is to “raise consciousness” of those who have unthinkingly 
used names that carried and reproduced insult and subordination.200 
In some cases, the traces of stigmatized identity lurk in many places 
within a language and related social practices, and a progressive critique 
and name replacement project needs to hunt them out quite broadly.201  The 
feminist critique of language is an example.  Beginning at least as early as 
the 1970s and continuing to this day, feminists have examined and 
challenged a number of ways in which accepted words, proper naming 
practices, and forms of address reflected and perpetuated gender 
stereotypes.202  Precisely because of the apparent transparency and 
objectivity of language and related social interactions, the stereotypes 
produced by linguistic usages and simultaneously reproducing these usages 
then to retain their legitimacy; the naming practices that perpetuate them 
appear to be neutral or at most of trivial import.  Feminists have made a 
significant effort to identify and reform these seemingly trivial gendered 
usages.  Some of this effort has involved theoretical work and 
consciousness-raising within the feminist movement, some has involved 
legal changes of various kinds.  Much of this work has occurred in 
individual interactions and confrontations.  I will never forget the 
vehement challenge of a graduate student when a professor addressed her 
as “Miss” in a seminar at Yale in 1973.  She wanted to be addressed as 
                                                                                                                          
=1351133.  On failure to mention bisexuality in discussions of gay men and lesbians, see generally 
Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000). 
200 Rusty Barrett, As Much As We Use Language: Lakoff’s Queer Augury, in LAKOFF, supra note 
198, at 296, 301 (“Although language change does not create social change, the examination of 
inequalities in language structure may become an important tool in struggles for social change by 
stimulating symbolic discussions of social injustice.”).  As an opponent of the feminist language project 
fulminates, “Women’s Lib is succeeding in making everybody self-conscious about his use of 
language.”  Michael Levin, Vs. Ms., in SEX EQUALITY 216, 217 (Jane English ed., 1974).  Levin 
considers the feminist language project an “imposition on our thinking process.”  Id.  Well, yes.  
Levin’s viewpoint is discussed infra.  
201 See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1073, 1086–90 
(1999) [hereinafter Poirier, Gender Stereotypes] (discussing gender schemata). 
202 See generally LAKOFF, supra note 198; Pat K. Chew & Lauren K. Kelley-Chew, Subtly Sexist 
Language, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 643 (2007) (documenting and critiquing the continuing use of 
male-gendered pronouns in legal discourse); Emens, supra note 133; Kim, supra note 199; Omi 
[Morgenstern Leissner], The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 321 (1997–
1998).  The author Omi uses only her/his first name in the title, disclosing surnames in the asterisk 
footnote.  Id. at 321 n.*.  Ironically, I cannot even tell which pronoun, “he” or “she”, to use in this 
footnote, as this Israeli given name does not convey gender to me, a non-Hebrew speaker, and English 
requires third person singular pronouns to correspond to the sex/gender of the persons referred to.  No 
name indeed. 
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“Ms.”    
The feminist critique of language has addressed many different kinds 
of words and naming practices, including “girl”/“woman”, gender-tags on 
names for occupations and other social categories, the loss of women’s 
surnames at marriage, the conferral of the father’s surname rather than the 
mother’s on children, the gendering of given names, and in more recent 
times various naming practices involving same-sex couples and their 
children.  The “Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.” controversy that I explore briefly 
below is only one.  I am confident that an exploration of the decades of 
feminist literature on names, gendered words, and related social practices 
would shed more light on the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction than I 
have the resources to do here.  
There are many levels to naming practices.  Individual uses of a name, 
form of address, or gendered word are of course also instantiations of that 
word in a language.  They are small and specific microperformances and 
broader social habits at the same time.203  Moreover, insofar as they are 
shared (which they must be to be understood), they may well become 
ritualized, for example in forms of address, such as “Mr.”/“Mrs.”/“Miss.”  
Ritualized practices of naming may in turn be embedded in various spheres 
of interaction—a specific school, church, union, or ethnic community, for 
example.204 The naming practices are also likely to be fixed and authorized 
in dictionaries and, if a cultural policing organization exists, in the decrees 
of something like the Académie Française.205  Some naming practices may 
be expected or required on forms and on their modern avatar, computerized 
forms.206  They may also be reinforced by what Elizabeth Emens has 
cogently called “desk-clerk law.”207 
                                                                                                                          
203 As I have argued, “A ‘language’ does not exist (except as an abstraction) apart from a very 
large series of individual acts and practices. There is no higher entity that ‘sources’ or ‘authorizes’ one 
particular language for all of us.”  Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1107. 
204 The astute reader may notice that my insistence on the primacy of local and specific instances 
of language and of naming practices is remarkably similar to the often-missed point that Althusser 
grounds his account of ideology in specific individuals’ specific rituals within specific practices and 
specific civic institutions (a.k.a. Ideological State Apparatuses).   
205 See Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1112 (discussing the Académie Française 
as a political referee of linguistic usage). 
206 For example, I might have to supply one of a limited set of honorifics, or a first and last name, 
or only one and not two last names, on a computerized form in order for it to be accepted by the 
computer program.  Kerry Abrams recently described to me in conversation how a computerized form 
categorically refused to accept hyphenated last names such as those of her children, so that she could 
not buy airline tickets for them that showed their legal names.  In an insightful article on the marriage 
controversy as a question of language, Mae Kuykendall describes the cultural importance of forms.  
“Printed forms continually reinforce the significance of the marriage status, while communicating a 
deceptive simplicity and uniformity relating to the underlying marital narratives.”  Mae Kuykendall, 
Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a Story about Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a 
Living Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 416–17 (1999) [hereinafter Kuykendall, 
Resistance].  Kuykendall describes forms as a kind of coerced speech with a set vocabulary.  Id. at 417. 
207 See Emens, supra note 133, at 824–27 (describing resistance by low-level functionaries to 
legal but socially untraditional naming choices).  Desk-clerk law occurs “not through any official grant 
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One particularly significant kind of fixity involves legally required 
names.  These take considerable effort to establish through a legislative or 
regulatory process,208 and then subsequently to expunge through a similar 
process.  Also, once established, they become embedded in those printed 
and computerized forms, which are costly to alter.  As for getting clerks to 
change their ways once they have learned a set of rules, that may be even 
more complicated. Legally recognizing certain identity names establishes 
them, to the detriment of alternatives that might be brought forward in 
practice.  The alternatives will not be used as often and will suffer by 
comparison to the official recognition of the preferred name, form, address, 
etc.  Occasionally there may be consequences to improperly filling out 
forms with unauthorized names and titles, as in the case we are about to 
consider.  And last but not least, when a naming practice is legally 
authorized, that authorization confers legitimacy on the name.  The name is 
either permitted or required by the state, and therefore those who read ill 
into the name and naming practice have a more difficult argument to make 
in all those others spheres of social interaction—theoretical discussion, 
within-group discourse, and individual interactions of all types. 
It is with this set of concerns in mind that we approach, briefly, the 
feminist attempt to challenge the practice and expectation that adult 
women would be addressed as “Miss” if unmarried and “Mrs.” if married.  
Feminists offered a neologism, “Ms.”, which continued the gender 
differentiation from “Mr.” (unlike for example “Comrade” in certain 
societies in certain languages209 at certain times) but no longer specified 
women’s marital status.210  In one jurisdiction the issue got to court.  At the 
time of Allyn v. Allison,211 California required women who desired to 
register to vote to designate themselves as either “Miss” or “Mrs.” There 
was no opting out.  There existed no parallel requirement for men.  Indeed, 
the forms of address in English did not make such a distinction for men. 
                                                                                                                          
of  discretion, but through . . . ignorance, impatience, or normative views.”  Id. at 810.  Cf. Dan M. 
Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 
607 (2000) (describing as “the sticky norms problem” deliberate resistance to carrying out changes in a 
law intended to change a social norm when decision makers disagree with the change). 
208 For example, Robin Lakoff reports that Representative Bella Abzug and others introduced a 
bill in Congress to abolish “Mrs.” and “Miss” in favor of “Ms.,” but it failed.  Lakoff, supra note 198, 
at 64.  
209 I am thinking of languages that do not have masculine and feminine grammatical forms, which 
likely would be expected to correlate with the gender of the person addressed.  In a language with 
masculine and feminine forms I’m not sure one could get away from gender in forms of address. 
210 See, e.g., Lakoff, supra note 198, at 64, 67–69.  All three forms—“Mrs.,” “Miss,” and “Ms.”—
are contractions of “mistress”.  “Ms.” was used sporadically as early as the 1700s.  Its modern use in 
preference to other appellations originated in 1961.  Wikipedia, Ms., available at http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Ms. (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).  
211 Allyn v. Allison, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App. 1973).  Although Shepard’s does not provide 
any indication of further history to the case, I take the notation at the end of the Allyn opinion to mean 
that the California Supreme Court denied certiorari, since three Justices of that court dissented from a 
denial of a hearing.  Id. at 81. 
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Two women sought to register to vote as “Ms.”  Their applications 
were denied.  They sought a writ of mandamus.  The trial court granted the 
state’s demurrer.  An appeal ensued.  The appellants argued that requiring 
them to designate themselves “Miss” or “Mrs.” required them to disclose 
marital status, which was (1) unnecessary to ensure accurate voter 
representation, thus a violation of the statute’s provisions for voter 
registration; (2) a burden imposed on women but not men, thus a violation 
of equal protection; and (3) a burden on women’s right to vote pursuant to 
the Nineteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.212    
The court rejected these challenges.  Justice Compton accepted the 
state’s argument that the indication of “Mrs.” would tell the state that the 
applicant was or had been married, and thus might have previously been 
registered under a different name.213  So the requirement plausibly helped 
to prevent voter registration fraud.  At that time, a woman married in 
California was expected or perhaps required to change her surname to that 
of her husband.214  Even though another requirement, the listing of all prior 
registrations, might have achieved the same objective, Justice Compton 
held that the court would not inquire into whether the agency’s method was 
the best one, so long as the justification it proffered was a reasonable 
one.215  Nor was the incidental disclosure of marital status for women 
found to be in any way burdensome, especially since marital status was in 
no way private; indeed marital status was a matter of public record.216 
Presiding Justice Roth, concurring, acknowledged that the challenged 
statutory section “without apparent solid reason, seeks and requires 
specific information from female voter registrants in respect of marital 
status which males are not required to give.”217  Nevertheless, Justice Roth 
did not discern any injury from the practice, even though it was of long 
standing.  The “discrimination [was] so trivial”218 that “even though it 
could be probably whipped and beaten into constitutional proportions”219 
he was inclined to allow the legislature to address the issue first.220  As 
                                                                                                                          
212 Id. at 78. 
213 Id. at 79–80. 
214 Id. at 80.  But cf. Kenneth L. Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial”: A Note on Law and the 
Symbolism of Women’s Dependency, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 546, 547 n.5 (1974) [hereinafter Karst, “A 
Discrimination so Trivial”] (discussing the common law of name changing upon marriage and whether 
it applied in California at the time of the Allyn opinion). 
215 Allyn, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 79–80. 
216 Id. at 80. 
217 Id. at 80 (Roth, J., concurring). He pointed out that driver’s license applications requested 
marital status for both sexes, directly, rather than relying on women’s honorific.  Id.  He also noted that 
although the voter registration statute required social security numbers and phone numbers, voter 
registration would not be denied if that information was withheld, in contrast to the unwaivable 
requirement that “Miss” or “Mrs.” be provided in order for a woman to register.  Id. at 81. 
218 Id. at 80. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 80–81. 
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Kenneth Karst’s consideration of the case points out, the Equal Rights 
Amendment was in the air,221 and in any event the California legislature 
repealed the “Miss”/ “Mrs.” provision the following year.222 
Justice Fleming’s brief concurrence pointed out that the usages of 
women’s honorific titles had shifted over time223 and that in fact the 
plaintiffs were free to call themselves either ”Miss” or “Mrs.”, just not a 
third term such as “Ms.”224  Kenneth Karst characterizes the tone of this 
concurrence as humorous.225 
Professor Karst provides a helpful place to start in analyzing Allyn.  He 
focuses on the tension between what seems a trivial matter and the 
weightier symbolic injury behind it.226 Karst writes that “the justices 
thought they were dealing with a constitutional trifle” and thus failed to 
take it seriously.227  Karst argues that the injury complained of (1) is not 
paltry and (2) should not have been left to the legislature to remedy or 
not.228  By requiring women to disclose marital status (more or less) before 
registering to vote, the state embedded in the voter registration process a 
symbolic acknowledgement of women’s historical dependency upon 
men.229  The “Miss”/“Mrs.” requirement was an affront to women’s 
dignity; it could have wide-ranging consequences,230 and would in 
particular be psychologically debilitating.231  Karst argued that “one’s self-
perception is enormously influential in determining choices”232—especially 
major life choices.  In telling women that a facet of their personal life 
symbolic of their past dependency still mattered to the state and had to be 
disclosed before they could vote, the “Miss”/“Mrs.” requirement denied 
them their right to “first-class citizenship”.233 This injury was in fact of 
constitutional scope, because in Karst’s view the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
equal protection guarantee is first and foremost about the dignity of 
                                                                                                                          
221 Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial,” supra note 214, at 555–57.  
222 Id. at 546–47 & n.4, 554. 
223 Allyn v. Allison, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (Fleming, J., concurring). 
224 Id. 
225 Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial,” supra note 214, at 548 (describing Justice Fleming’s 
opinions as having “a wink here or a knowing chuckle there.”). 
226 Id. at 546. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 549.  Karst points out that the California Supreme Court had already held sex, like race, 
to be a suspect class.  Id. at 550 & n.14 (citing Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971)). 
229 Karst discerned women’s dependency on men to be a central issue of the women’s movement, 
as it was emerging in the 1970s time frame. Id. at 552 & n.26. 
230 Id. at 551. 
231 Id. at 550 (“Once a certain subsistence level is attained, what really matters about inequality is 
something that happens inside our heads . . . .”). 
232 Id. at 551.  Karst writes, “[T]he most destructive dependency of all is psychological, the 
dependency that limits a woman’s sense of who she is and what she can do.”  Id. at 552. 
233 Id. at 553.  It did not matter that many or most women might still choose to use “Miss” or 
“Mrs.”  Id.  Making “Ms.” available would provide the ability for women to send a different message 
about themselves.  Id. at 552 n.26.  It opened other possibilities for women’s self-definition.  Id. 
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citizenship.234  The judicial approval of the legislature’s “Miss”/“Mrs.” 
requirement was “particularly destructive,”235 and the opinion’s tone of 
triviality and levity only added insult to injury.236    
In a footnote, Karst observes that “The title ‘Ms.’ is designed . . . both 
for the woman’s own consumption and for the edification of the outside 
world[.]”237 In designating herself “Ms.” a woman sends a message that 
she does not wish to be defined by marital status, and calls into question a 
world view that makes that important.238  This footnote contains a germ of 
the insight that the appellations “Miss”, “Mrs.”, and “Ms.” constitute the 
woman and those who interpret her, and that at stake is the choice about 
how to present oneself in the face of a subordinating naming tradition.  
(“Ms.” is for all that not so neutral; it carries its own message, but a 
different one.)239 Using a term discussed earlier, in the consideration of 
Althusser, insisting on “Ms.” is a kind of “interpellative advocacy”.240 
The “Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction is not just about women’s dependency, 
at least in some people’s view, but is specifically about recognizing the 
different sexual roles of men and women, and indicating the sexual 
availability of women.  Michael Levin, for example, offers an evolutionary 
biology justification of “Miss”/“Mrs.”:  it is necessary to facilitate the 
genetic variety that is accomplished by sexual intercourse.241   Man is the 
natural “aggressor,”242 Levin argues, and the distinction  
signals the male immediately as to the potentials for his 
future relations with [a] new female.  The possibility of 
sexual awareness always exists between man and woman, 
and Miss/Mrs. is one of the many ways of accommodating 
                                                                                                                          
234 Id.  Karst’s expansive view of equal citizenship under the fourteenth amendment was 
expressed at length in an important article a short time later.  Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship, 
supra note 36.  Moreover Karst wrote in anticipation of the adoption of the federal Equal Rights 
Amendment, which would have granted women equal rights under law in broad terms, parallel to the 
fourteenth amendment’s provision of equal rights for all races.  Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial,” 
supra note 214, at 555–57. 
235 Karst, “A Discrimination So Trivial,” supra note 214, at 552. 
236 Id. at 553. 
237 Id. at 552 n.26. 
238 Id. (quoting B. Sonka, Language, Self-Concept, and Social Change (1973) (unpublished 
manuscript)). 
239 Cf. Emens, supra note 133, at 766–67 (arguing that none of the choices women face in 
deciding what to do with their surname upon marriage is particularly good, and that any choice will 
elicit disapproval from someone).  I would also point out that the fact that men have only one honorific, 
“Mr.”, does not mean “Mr.” is neutral.  Instead, the fact that “Mr.” is not expected to change upon a 
man’s marriage reflects a particular position about male identity vis-à-vis marriage.  If “Mr.” seems 
neutral, that is because it is transparent, in the sense Barbara Flagg uses the word to describe 
interactions whose structure of dominance and subordination is masked and appears natural.  See Flagg, 
supra note 193.   
240 See supra notes 178–79and accompanying text (noting that Gabilondo coined the term 
“interpellative advocacy”). 
241 Levin, supra note 200, at 200. 
242 Id. 
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this. . . . Miss/Mrs. has come about through its evolutionary 
value and consilience with human nature.243 
So this is the “spontaneity” that would be destroyed by self-consciousness 
about sexism in language!244  No wonder Levin objects to the way the 
feminist critique of language would interfere with his communication.  
Shades of Catharine MacKinnon! 
I find Levin’s interpretation of “Miss”/“Mrs.” obnoxious, as well as 
degrading to women. What ought the state to do, faced with an 
interpretation such as Levin’s?  If his interpretation is anomalous, held 
only by an outlier here and there, then it could be ignored.  If it is 
widespread it might need to be addressed.  But how?  The state can hardly 
go in and legislate and enforce different usages in all the realms and 
instances where honorifics are deployed.245  However, one place where the 
state does have control is in official requirements, such as the voter 
registration law at issue in Allyn v. Allison.246 Here the state might note that 
in perpetuating the distinction, and in giving it legitimacy by making its 
use a prerequisite to voter registration, the state gives credence to the fact 
that the “Miss”/ “Mrs.” distinction must mean something—that it is in fact 
not so trivial a distinction.  And where an interpretation as obnoxious as 
Levin’s of a linguistic usage is likely widely held, the state might well 
decide to move from requiring that usage to at least making it an optional, 
personal decision, not only enhancing individual choice, but removing the 
imprimatur for potentially obnoxious and harmful interpretations of 
identity due to the state’s linguistic endorsement of a particular naming 
practice.  Further change could then be addressed in non-legal spheres, via 
a social dialogue over a period of time.247 
                                                                                                                          
243 Id. at 219. 
244 Id. 
245 This point was acknowledged by Robin Lakoff.  Lakoff, supra note 198, at 68.  When 
language reflects a social practice, a good deal of social change has to occur before one can expect the 
law to change, and in any event the law will not be the prime source of change.  Id. 
246 Allyn v. Allison, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 
247 In their considerations of marital naming practices, both Elizabeth Emens and Suzanne Kim 
observe that despite the removal of any legal constraints, the behavior of men and women around 
surname change upon marriage is quite different, suggesting that in this area of social naming practice 
the constraints are primarily social and not legal.  Emens, supra note 133, at 763 (suggesting that social 
convention rather than law is driving behavior, at least for women); Kim, supra note 199, text before 
note 150 (arguing that social forces construct women’s name-changing options, and that women are 
operating within a structure of gender hierarchy that initially limits women’s choices). The constraints 
around names for same-sex couples are similar.  
As Jack Balkin points out, “Large-scale changes in social structure require social transformation 
over long periods of time, and law forms only a part of that phenomenon.”  J.M. Balkin, The 
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315 (1997).  But this observation does not mean that 
change in the direction of equality and autonomy is unavailable. Speaking generally, Robert Leckey 
observes that “Social conduct and cultural forces not characterizable as direct emanations of the state . . 
. limit the freedoms associated with liberal constitutional democracies.”  Leckey, supra note 14, at 457.  
There is a “discriminatory remainder that survives change” and is “beyond the purview of 
constitutional law.”  Id. at 458.  Nevertheless, referring to Kenji Yoshino’s important work on 
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Moreover, in considering what to do about an obnoxious and harmful 
interpretation of a linguistic usage, the state ought to take into account its 
history.  The “Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction was not on the books by accident.  
It likely reflected the worldview that Mr. Levin articulated, once more 
widely held than in the 1970s, but undoubtedly persisting—if somewhat 
muted—given the short time frame in which the background culture 
around sex/gender had begun to change.  Thus both the history of the 
“Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction and the possibility that continuing to require it 
legally would encourage the continuation of obnoxious and harmful 
understandings of it are relevant.  Conversely, derequiring the usage might 
in fact force Mr. Levin and his ilk to do what they do not want to do, viz.,  
consider what lies behind their transparent choice of words.  And it would 
certainly also send a message to and empower those who otherwise might 
be demoralized by the state’s endorsement of the distinction, as Karst 
points out. 
Let us take a moment now to compare the “Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.” 
distinction to the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction.  In both, progressive 
forces seek to squelch the official recognition of a set of terms that forces a 
distinction (“Miss”/“Mrs.” or “civil union”/“marriage”) in favor of a term 
that obscures the underlying social fact highlighted by the distinction 
(“Ms.” for all women regardless of marital status, and “marriage” or some 
as-yet-undeveloped name for all legally recognized couples and their 
families regardless of the sex of the members of the couple).  The 
underlying social movement is unlikely to succeed in replacing the old 
terms altogether in a short or intermediate time frame.  But legally de-
requiring the naming distinction makes it more often possible legally and 
socially to deploy the more inclusive usage, facilitates personal choice 
about how to present oneself, and slowly allows change in the diffuse 
social naming practices that might otherwise function to reproduce the 
distinction. Moreover, both distinctions are harmful in significant part 
because of their history, which deployed, reflected, and reinforced 
stereotypes and related prejudices and dominant/subordinate relationships 
in ways which the unexamined naming practices helped to naturalize. 
There are differences, to be sure.  In the one case “Ms.,” the 
neologism, is preferred.  In the other, “civil union,” the neologism, is 
attacked.  It is attacked because it perpetuates the distinction, while the 
new word “Ms.” obscures a distinction perpetuated by “Mrs.”/“Miss”. 
We should proceed carefully here.  State recognition of “civil union” is 
                                                                                                                          
covering, Leckey argues that social change ultimately is forwarded by “conversations” that “force the 
demands made of members of minorities groups to come into view.”  Id. (discussing KENJI YOSHINO, 
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 193–95 (2006)).  That “conversation” 
strategy is being explicitly implemented by marriage equality groups and by LGBTQ groups more 
generally.  See infra Part III.D.  And changes in the law around names for families can free up the 
possibility of those conversations. 
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in significant respects an advance over no legal recognition and no name.  
Indeed, in many parts of the country, a local or state legal recognition of a 
same-sex relationship even with a different name would be significant 
progress for marriage equality and for the GLBTQ movement generally.  If 
one were to average out the country as a whole instead of determining the 
issue state by state, “civil union,” or some such novel terminology for the 
legal recognition of same-sex couples, while retaining the name of 
“marriage” for different-sex couples, might well be the current point of 
dynamic equilibrium.  But we are talking about Connecticut here.  And in 
Connecticut—which is the social background community relevant to the 
naming practices at issue in the Kerrigan case248—“civil union” can be 
understood to do more harm than good.  “Civil union” represents progress 
compared to no name, but retards progress when compared to “marriage” 
in a state where the partial recognition of GLBTQ normal status, marked 
and forwarded by civil union, is already well underway. 
The “Miss”/“Mrs.”/“Ms.” comparison also serves to remind us that one 
might seek to defuse the cultural tension over “marriage” and same-sex 
couples by getting rid of legal endorsement for marriage altogether, having 
states grant the benefits and confer the responsibilities on same-sex and 
different-sex couples alike, but with a different term altogether.249  Former 
Vermont Chief Justice Amestoy, for example, has proposed “marriage 
unions.”250  This new third term would correspond to the feminist “Ms.”  
Such a change in terminology is unlikely, however.  The partisans on both 
                                                                                                                          
248 Doctrinally, one might link this assertion of the relevance of local social context to the Geisler 
factors invoked and considered by the Kerrigan court, especially the sixth factor.  See Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 421 (Conn. 2008) (listing six additional factors to be considered 
when construing the state constitution; the sixth of the Geisler factors is “contemporary economic and 
sociological considerations, including relevant public policies”) (citing State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 
1232 (Conn. 1992)).  The portion of the Kerrigan opinion that applies the sixth Geisler factor addresses 
four points, including the fact that marriage is an elevated and central status while civil union is novel, 
and that there is a history of discrimination against gay persons against which the distinction must be 
read.  Id. at 474–75.  As in the earlier portion of the opinion on cognizable injury, much of the court’s 
reasoning here is lengthy direct quotations, from In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) and 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003). 
249 Proposals to this effect seem to be increasingly common.  See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, 
“Defending” Marriage: A Modest Proposal, 41 HOW. L.J. 215, 216 (1998) (recommending exploration 
of the question why the state is in the marriage business at all); Stephanie Coontz, Taking Marriage 
Private, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2007, at A23, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File 
(recommending that we leave churches to “decide what marriages they deem ‘licit,’” but allow both 
gay and straight couples access to “the legal protections and obligations of a committed relationship”); 
Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 4, at 411–14 (discussing the potential merits of disestablishment, 
whereby states would relinquish control over marriage altogether and “would no longer marry 
anyone”); Edward A Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil 
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006) (opining that “it is time to abolish civil marriage,” 
and that marriage “should become solely a religious and cultural institution with no legal definition or 
status”). 
250 Jeff Amestoy, Ending the Gay-Marriage War: California’s Ruling May Point Toward 
‘Marriage Unions’ as a Solution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 22, 2008, at 9, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, CSM File. 
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sides of the marriage controversy seek to retain the word “marriage” 
precisely because of all its history and connotations.  Neither traditionalists 
nor marriage equality advocates would willingly let it go as part of a 
compromise.  Indeed, the point is made in the hypothetical that finds its 
way into the Kerrigan opinion: would married couples willingly accept 
that their relationships be denominated “civil unions?”251  For most married 
couples, the answer is clearly not.252 
D.  Naming Practices and Questions of Scale:  The Local, the Universal, 
the Social, the Legal, Storytelling, and Change from the Bottom Up 
In order to appreciate the mechanism of the harm of the “civil 
union”/“marriage” distinction, we must keep in mind that larger structures 
of discrimination and stigmatizing social identification do not exist 
separately from the microinteractions that are produced by them and that 
reproduce and reinscribe them.  Status and identity here, as always, must 
be thought through from the bottom up. 
I will let Kenneth Karst introduce this issue.  He writes in Local 
Discourse and the Social Issues253 that while we may engage important 
social issues at larger levels, through attempts at universal discourse and in 
the mass media, “[T]he life of every individual citizen goes on here and 
now—in the ‘here’ of home, neighborhood, social circle, religious 
congregation, work, or school; in the ‘now’ of day-to-day activities that 
provide continuous streams of talk and meaning-laden behavior.”254  Karst 
calls this stream of communicative interaction “local discourse.”255  He 
specifically identifies several arenas of local discourse:  household, friends, 
and relations;256 schools;257 the religious congregation;258 and the 
workplace.259  Sounds like Althusser. 
Karst emphasizes that local discourse is “a powerful source of belief 
and conduct,”260 and moreover “behavior shapes meanings (as well as 
reflects them).”261  He stresses this point:  behavior “is not just a reaction to 
speech: behavior has its own acculturating—causal—consequences for 
speech and for further action: ‘people act themselves into a way of 
                                                                                                                          
251 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 417 n.14. 
252 Id. 
253 Kenneth L. Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 1 
(2000) [hereinafter Karst, Local Discourse]. 
254 Id. at 2. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 5–7. 
257 Id. at 7–9. 
258 Id. at 9–10. 
259 Id. at 10–11. 
260 Id. at 2–3. 
261 Id. at 3. 
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believing as readily as they believe themselves into a way of acting.’”262  It 
is not wholly accurate to say that culture is the assignment of meaning to 
behavior; behavior “has its own role in creating, reinforcing, or 
undermining meanings.”263 
Local discourse “leads us to believe not only in the identity labels we 
apply to ourselves, but also in those we apply to others.”264  Local 
discourse “is particularly influential on self-definition, and thus on the 
formation of perceptions and beliefs about gender, about race, and about 
religion.  So both local discourse-as-talk and discourse-as-behavior have 
powerful implications for the politics and the law of the social issues.”265  
At other points in the essay Karst adds sexual orientation to this list,266 and 
he examines the local workings of behavior around sexual orientation and 
local discourse.267  Coming out, for example, can be understood as a 
process of local discourse: when George comes out to Bob, “George’s 
whole life becomes part of the local discourse that adds to Bob’s 
acculturation” and affects his mental image of gay people.268  Moreover, 
when this happens millions of times on the local level, “local discourse is 
well on its way to deciding another of the social issues.”269 
How can we understand the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction in the 
Connecticut Civil Union Act as it addresses and affects local practice?  The 
act is an intervention, made possible by several decades of progressive 
moves towards recognition of gay and lesbian individuals and couples in 
Connecticut (and elsewhere) individually piecemeal and then in larger 
doctrinal leaps.  In offering the name “civil union” along with the rights 
and responsibilities equivalent to marriage, the Act does move forward, 
bestowing an official name and an official recognition on same-sex 
couples, where they had not had one before.  It moves beyond tolerance 
and beyond a limited recognition in those specific instances where a couple 
provides a sufficiently compelling performance, as assessed by reference to 
an idealized heterosexual married couple.270 
                                                                                                                          
262 Id. at 13 (quoting JEROME BRUNER: ON KNOWING: ESSAYS FOR THE LEFT HAND 132–33 
(1979)). 
263 Id. at 24. 
264 Id. at 12. 
265 Id. at 3.  Karst expands on the way in which local discourse creates and recreates group 
identities.  Id. at 12–13. 
266 Id. at 12 (including sexual orientation in the list along with race, gender, and religion). 
267 Id. at 21–23 (discussing the powerful community-forming influence of the Stonewall Riot in 
1969 and of gay bars throughout the 1960s). 
268 Id. at 23. 
269 Id. 
270 See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage Equality 
in New Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris a Dead End or Just a Detour?, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 291, 308–10, 
318–20, 347–48 (2007) [hereinafter Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale] (explaining first the beginnings 
of the functional equivalence doctrine in New Jersey, and subsequently the New Jersey Domestic 
Partnership Act, which followed the initiation of the Lewis v. Harris litigation). 
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But at the same time it withholds another name, “marriage,” and all its 
correlated kinship words and ceremonial words and practices.  Same-sex 
couples may still get “married” and have  “weddings” and call themselves  
“husbands” or “wives,” but the state has made the official and public 
statement that that set of words is social only, and not official.  In a society 
where civil recognition of the state carries such weight, this statement 
maintains a distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples in the 
law, even as it confers legal rights, benefits, and responsibilities on same-
sex couples.  This distinction is reflected in the name distinction. 
Much of my own work in the gender area has insisted on always 
keeping in mind the ways in which the issues of the sex/gender 
Kulturkampf are local, specific, and material, as well as more abstract, 
legal, and sometimes argued about in universal categories.271  In one recent 
formulation, I called this “asking the place/space question,” in homage to 
Katharine Bartlett’s formulation of feminist inquiry as “asking the woman 
question.”272  The place/space question will typically allow us “to develop 
a tiered description of the praxis of challenging various exclusions that 
create and maintain a sense of second-class citizenship.”273 
In the context of the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction, two of my 
articles are particularly relevant.  Ten years ago, in Gender Stereotyping at 
                                                                                                                          
271 For more detailed analysis of this issue, see Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: 
Visible Same-Sex Couples and the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 3 
(2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Microperformances of Identity] (applying some of the insights of Erving 
Goffman, Joseph Gusfield, Kenji Yoshino, and Judith Butler to the ways in which visible 
microperformances of same-sex couples as couples trouble traditional notions of marriage and family); 
Marc R. Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where Is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FLA. INT’L U. L. 
REV 307, 317–34 (2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Gender, Place] (answering the “Where is same-sex 
marriage?” question in terms of territorial legal jurisdiction, aterritorial communities of shared 
meaning, metonymic conflicts where a small performance invokes larger concepts, and everyday 
interactions); Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the Kulturkampf: Why 
Federalism Is Not the Main Event, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV.  RTS. L. REV. 387, 387–92 (2008) [hereinafter 
Poirier, Identity Processes] (arguing that the contemporary Kulturkampf over sex, gender, sexual 
orientation, marriage, and family occurs primarily at the level of local interaction and at the level of 
large discursive space, so that the state-by-state patchwork of different rules is incidental rather than 
central to an appreciation of the controversy); Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 4, at 359–401 
(analyzing the traditionalist sense of injury from same-sex marriage both in terms of the institution’s 
meaning and in the everyday visible practices of same-sex couples as married couples); Poirier, 
Piecemeal and Wholesale, supra note 270 (analyzing the progress towards marriage equality in New 
Jersey in terms of the transgressive visibility of gay men and lesbians first as individuals and then as 
couples; this visibility eventually facilitated claims of legal rights, first piecemeal and then wholesale); 
Poirier, Hastening, supra note 194, at 271 (analyzing the conflicts of openly gay men serving in the 
Boy Scouts in terms of an attempt to control adult role models of masculinity in everyday interactions, 
to prevent boys from being influenced by sissies); Poirier, Cognitive Bias, supra note 13, at 459 
(analyzing discrimination in the workplace in terms of specific interactions that are caused by and 
reproducing unconscious biases; and arguing that intent is irrelevant to liability, on the model of 
liability for dangerous natural conditions). 
272 Poirier, Gender, Place, supra note 271, at 334–35 (discussing Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist 
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831, 837–49 (1990) (arguing that repeatedly “asking the 
woman question” becomes a method that furthers important feminist political goals)). 
273 Id. at 338. 
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Work,274 I undertook a broad description of the workings of categorization 
and stereotyping at the micro level, relying on earlier and germinal work in 
the field of cognitive bias.275  I suggested that important social categories 
were tagged for gender, and that everyday processes of recognition 
implemented unconscious gender stereotypes, simultaneously 
(re)producing important social categories and the practices and experiences 
of dominance and subordination.276  I argued that this “system of social 
categories constitutes a rich feedback system that will tend to maintain 
itself in homeostasis.”277  This homeostatic process involved an ongoing 
interplay between (1) real world instances of the social categories and each 
individual’s specific cognitive version of the categories; (2) among each 
individual’s mutually reinforcing cognitively-held categories; and (3) 
among different mutually-reinforcing real-world exemplars of the 
cognitive categories.278  These interlocking micropractices form “a truly 
diffuse system of unconscious prejudice. . . . which is not intentionally 
reformed easily over a short period of time.”279 
I suggested that this analysis of gender schemas as they occur in 
practice paralleled similar analyses of ideology and language: all are 
diffuse systems of social interaction, all rely on representation, all produce 
systems of dominance and subordination, and all share similar homeostatic 
processes and are therefore difficult to change.280  Martha Fineman, whom 
I relied on extensively in this section of that article, provides a helpful 
summary.  She writes, “One way to understand the concept of ideology is 
to consider it as an information processing system.  An ideology is 
constituted by a complementary collection of symbols, beliefs, and 
assumptions that, in combination, rationalize and give meaning to 
                                                                                                                          
274 Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1073–79.  This article was part of a symposium 
panel on VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (1998), and in particular 
developed Dr. Valian’s discussion of gender schemas. 
275 For some classic analyses of this issue, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, supra note 131.  The social science literature 
on implicit bias grows apace, as does the legal academic literature seeking to apply it.  Basically, at this 
juncture, “[t]here is . . . overwhelming evidence that mental constructs that are cognitively accessible 
influence how the perceiver evaluates and judges others.” Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair 
Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1083 (2006).  
Samuel Bagenstos responds to critics of the science of implicit bias by arguing that their criticism is 
really not about the science, but instead about what the goal of antidiscrimination law should be.  
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
477, 479–80 (2007). 
276 Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1086–90; cf. Steven L. Winter, The “Power” 
Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721, 805–09 (1996) (discussing the diffuse replication of gender roles). 
277 Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1101. 
278 Id. at 1101–06. 
279 Id. at 1106.  We should contrast the essentially unconscious homeostatic process that I 
described with the deliberate undermining of legislative change, which Dan Kahan described as the 
“sticky norms” problem.  See Kahan, supra note 207. 
280 Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1106–13.   
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discourses.”281  Moreover,  
[D]ominant ideology is more likely to operate as a 
conservative force, serving to tame or domesticate discourses 
by exerting a confining pressure on their initial development, 
ultimately channeling even the most radical ideas into 
categories approved by the existing conceptual system. . . . 
Dominant ideologies are subtly and conclusively expressed 
and repressed in the very creation and recreation of social 
norms and conventions. . . . A dominant ideology is 
transmitted through everyday discourse—through language, 
symbols, and images as well as through the operations of 
formal institutions and structures of power.282 
With this appreciation of the mechanism of reproduction of stereotypes 
in mind, I suggested that it might be possible to disrupt the cultural and 
cognitive reproduction of gendered social categories by shifting the 
examples encountered in the real world and by introducing counter-images 
in the media, so as to change the content of these categories bit by bit.283  
This idea to conceive of reform of social practices of prejudice and 
discrimination as the cumulative effect of many small interventions at the 
local level is found in current scholarship on discrimination that takes 
cognitive processes into account.  For example, Tristin Green’s most recent 
account of appearance discrimination in the workplace understands 
personal appearance choices sometimes to be connected to 
microperformances working against race and gender stereotypes; Green 
would allow those acts of transgressive appearance to operate against a 
contrary employer code of dress and behavior, so long as the employee 
asserted that s/he was in fact expressing a particular trait for an identity 
category that had been historically the subject of processes of dominance 
and subordination.284  Jerry Kang’s appreciation of the microprocesses by 
which racial subordination is perpetuated through the recurrence of images 
that sustain cognitive categories leads to his proposal to introduce “Trojan 
horses of race” into various social settings via “debiasing public service 
                                                                                                                          
281 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 20 (1995). 
282 Id. at 21–22. 
283 Poirier, Gender Stereotypes, supra note 201, at 1097–98, 1120–21.  
284 Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact 
Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 418–20 (2008).  Similarly, Tristin Green and Alexandra Kalev, 
noting that many of the sources of discrimination are relational, have proposed a series of structural 
approaches in the work place that would reorient it from “stereotype reinforcing” to “stereotype 
challenging.”  Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the 
Relational Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1436 (2008).  Thus for example they recommend structuring 
work through cooperative interdependence rather than rigid hierarchy, id. at 1449, and relying on 
network collaboration in which higher and lower status workers are placed on collaborative teams.  Id. 
at 1449–53. 
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announcements,” so as to disrupt and shift the processes that (re)produce 
stereotypes on the level of everyday interaction.285  A small section of an 
article of mine on cognitive bias reiterated the role of visibility of 
workplace performances of gendered occupational roles in creating and 
maintaining gender stereotypes, and argued that the owners of workplaces 
should be held responsible in some measure to control the sites of 
reproduction of disadvantageous gender stereotypes.286 
One can appreciate the brave forays into transgressive visibility 
undertaken in the past by lone individuals; they have made possible the 
current broader challenges to traditionalist views on homosexuality.287  
Recently, in Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and 
the Marriage Controversy, I juxtaposed some of Erving Goffman’s 
scrupulous descriptions of small personal interactions around identity 
performance, Kenji Yoshino’s consideration of passing and covering, and 
some of Judith Butler’s writings about transgressive identity 
performance.288  In different ways, all these authors link the cumulative 
effect of microperformances to the larger identity categories, including 
normal and stigmatized identity categories, that are at stake in a certain 
kind of social movement. 
In this regard, I also bring to bear, in Microperformances, an essay on 
new social movements by sociologist Joseph Gusfield.289  He argues that 
where traditional social movements typically had concrete economic and 
legislative goals in mind, a certain kind of newer and diffuse social 
                                                                                                                          
285 Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1579–84 (2005).  See generally 
Kang & Banaji, supra note 275, at 1080 (arguing that “we need a new model of discrimination for 
implicit bias—one based on a more accurate model of human cognition and emotions.  This new model 
must promote proactive structural interventions that minimize harm without relying solely on potential 
individual litigation.”). 
286 Poirier, Cognitive Bias, supra note 13, at 464, 486, 491.  Authors typically conceive of these 
proposed interventions in terms of visibility.  Mae Kuykendall, however, uses aural and linguistic 
imagery to describe this emergence of same-sex relationships towards acceptability.  See Kuykendall, 
Gay Marriage, supra note 34, at 1027 (discerning an increasing “willingness to listen to the lives of 
gay people” and an obligation of the state “to provide structures that address spoken lives”); id. at 1028 
(describing “a program of rhetorical silencing”); id. at 1009 (arguing that same-sex marriage litigation 
“assigns to [courts] a historic role in exploding the vacuum of public speech voiced to celebrate gay 
marriage”; see also Kuykendall, Resistance, supra note 206, at 388 (describing the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act as a project of “de-authorization of a subset of marriage speech that a significant number 
of citizens deploy for self-definition and that a significant number of other citizens respect and adopt”); 
id. at 391 (arguing that “the critical fact about gay marriage is the reality of its being spoken, and the 
accompanying ordinary expectation that the state will absorb the expanded meaning”). The two 
vocabularies—visible and linguistic/aural—are entirely compatible.  Nor are they metaphors. Both 
describe important, concrete ways in which LGBT individuals and couples are either recognized and 
acknowledged socially and legally, or in which recognition is withheld.   
287 See, e.g., Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale, supra note 270, at 297–300 (describing the 
piecemeal progress of early gay and lesbian rights movements). 
288 See Poirier, Microperformances of Identity, supra note 271. 
289 Id. at 23–25, 67 (discussing Joseph R. Gusfield, The Reflexivity of Social Movements: 
Collective Behavior and Mass Society Revisited, in NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: FROM IDEOLOGY TO 
IDENTITY 58 (Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, & Joseph R. Gusfield eds., 1994)). 
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movement is also about meaning and identity.290  As such, one may 
participate in the sense of realizing that things are not necessarily as they 
were in everyday life, without being corralled and organized by the leaders 
of the movement.291  The potential shift in diffuse social meaning that is 
effected by these movements is available to everyone, at the level of small-
scale everyday life.  Indeed, as Gusfield and his co-authors argue in 
another essay, “many contemporary movements are ‘acted out’ in 
individual actions rather than through or among mobilized groups.”292 
Thus, we can appreciate small and personal interactions to be not the 
tail-end of identity-based social movements, but their fundamental building 
block.  And the insertion of a differential naming practice into these 
everyday interactions can be appreciated as a potential disruption of the 
basic mechanism of seeking to change social and legal mechanisms of 
identity recognition.  To be sure, the marriage equality movement, like 
other identity-based social movements, has specific and significant legal 
goals in mind too, but it also contains very important elements of retooling 
microinteractions around family recognition, normal and stigmatized 
status, and increased dignity and freedom.  It is both local and larger than 
local at the same time. 
One can discern both kinds of concern in skillful articulations of the 
marriage equality movement’s politics.  This is evident in a recent 
articulation of strategy sent out by all the major LGBT litigation and 
advocacy groups in June 2008, in the wake of the California marriage 
equality victory.  In a document entitled Make Change, Not Lawsuits,293 
same-sex couples were encouraged to get married in California if they 
wished, but not to sue in their home states, and not to sue the federal 
government or their employers.  Instead, once they got married, they 
should “call themselves married, and ask (sometimes demand) that family, 
friends, neighbors, businesses, employers and the community treat their 
marriages with respect.”294  Why?  “Making the marriages of same-sex 
                                                                                                                          
290 Gusfield, supra note 289, at 64 (arguing that social movements typically involve both formal 
associational structures with specific goals and a more diffuse challenge to cultural meanings, including 
everyday interactions and understandings of identity).  In one example, he argues that “Homosexuals 
attempt to change discriminatory laws but also become more open about their identity.  Interaction 
between homosexuals and heterosexuals takes on a new tone.”  Id. at 66.  See also Reed, supra note 34, 
at 895–900 (discussing the production of “identity goods” by social movements, and the way in which 
state constitutional politics may be shaped by struggles over identity goods). 
291 Gusfield, supra note 289, at 62 (arguing that being a member of the women’s movement is 
about ideational commitment rather than formal membership, and “has its locus in a multiplicity of 
events, often that of individuals”). 
292 Hank Johnston et al., Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements, in NEW SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS: FROM IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY 3, 7 (Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, & Joseph R. 
Gusfield eds., 1994). 
293 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., MAKE CHANGE, NOT LAWSUITS (2008), available 
at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/Joint_Advisory_-_Final.pdf?docID=3241 [hereinafter 
MAKE CHANGE]. 
294 Id. at 1. 
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couples a conspicuous part of American society will help us get something 
we’ll need to win ultimately: public acceptance of equal treatment for 
lesbian and gay families.”295  It is these diffuse “conversations”296 that will 
“make the changes in law enduring and real at a day-to-day level.”297   I 
analyzed the Make Change strategy—which I call a “conversation” 
strategy—in a section of my Microperformances article.298 
The conversation strategy develops apace.  In late February, 2009, in 
the wake of the November, 2008, Proposition 8 reversal by referendum of 
the California marriage equality decision, a new effort within the 
“conversation” strategy was unveiled.299  The American Civil Liberties 
Union LGBT & AIDS Project argued that 
Research has shown that the single most effective way to 
change people’s minds on LGBT issues is through one-to-one 
conversations, between either gay people or solid allies and 
their friends and family.  Knowing someone gay, it turns out, 
is not enough.  People have to talk with someone they trust 
about what it is like to be gay—ways in which it poses 
special challenges, ways in which it is quite ordinary.300 
This strategy is now not just about coming out; it is about contact, 
conversation, and interaction with visibly LGTBQ folk.  So a website has 
been created, as part of a coordinated conversation project, to encourage 
LGBTQ people to talk to three friends or acquaintances, not just about 
coming out, but about what it is like to be gay.301  There are apparently 
several similar sites, and no copyright, so the whole project is expected to 
evolve.302  The “conversation” strategy has come of age.303 
                                                                                                                          
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 5. 
297 Id. 
298 Poirier, Microperformances of Identity, supra note 271, at 59–72 (discussing the 
“conversation” strategy).  
299 See Matt Coles, Prop 8: Let’s Not Make the Same Mistake Next Time, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 
26, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-coles/prop-8-lets-not-make-the_b_170271.html 
(discussing the election loss and how to garner more votes in the future). 
300 Id.  See Fowler, supra note 23 (describing what is essentially a conversation strategy being 
deployed in view of the anticipated loss in the California Supreme Court on the challenge to 
proposition 8); Jesse McKinley, Group Renews Fight for Same-Sex Marriage in California, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A21 (same).  
301 Tell3, http://www.tell-three.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2009). 
302 Coles, supra note 299. 
303 Compare MAKE CHANGE, supra note 293, at 1–5 (suggesting that conversation will help make 
change), and Coles, supra note 299 (promoting one-on-one conversation as the most effective way to 
change people’s minds about gay marriage), with Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal 
Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 567, 610–13 (1994–95) (explaining that gay persons should share what it means to them 
to be married).  Wolfson was a Senior Staff Attorney of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund at 
the time of this publication.  Id. at 567 n.*.  The essay includes a section on “what is to be done” to 
further the cause of marriage equality.  Id. at 610–14.  While acknowledging that the battles to achieve 
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Now consider what the insertion of a novel and unfamiliar term for a 
key family form into those conversations might do.  As I have suggested, 
the “conversation” strategy around marriage equality relies on the fact that 
everyone involved already has a pretty good appreciation of what 
“marriage” means.304  Then we get a law that tells same-sex couples their 
relationships are legally recognized, but as “civil unions.”  Now what?  In 
Connecticut, if individuals and couples converse in terms of “civil union” 
the whole “conversation” strategy will be denatured and confusing.  How 
can one talk about what it feels like to be a partner in a civil union?  It just 
will not have the effect that the leaders of the marriage equality movement 
are counting on.  It is less intelligible in a wide variety of 
microinteractions.  One important point here: the smallest of details in 
interactions around “marriage” and “civil union” matter.  They matter not 
just in a personal sense, but in a political sense as well.  The name 
“marriage” and what it automatically conveys to those engaged in 
conversations are central to the marriage equality movement at this 
juncture.  And that is because the local instances of naming practices and 
what they communicate are integral to the larger structures of identity and 
meaning that it is the goal of the political movement to change. 
A final point for this section is fittingly both narrow and broad.  We 
have a name for a certain social practice or device that cuts through the 
local and the universal, communicating persuasively in a way that can 
change minds: storytelling, or narrative.  Narrative is concrete and is 
persuasive in its concreteness.  Yet it also contains and conveys exemplars 
that appear to be generalizable.  It is a vehicle for moral conversation from 
time immemorial.  Narrative can be deceptive and also can be misused.305  
But narrative is essential to the politics of marriage equality. 
This is true only in part because narrative forms the basis of the current 
“conversation” strategy, as I am calling it.  This idea about the narrative 
edge came to me while I was reviewing the affidavits in the Kerrigan 
case.306  They are extraordinarily gracious, articulate, compelling vignettes.  
                                                                                                                          
access to marriage for same-sex couples would involve other fora in addition to the courts, the role of 
individuals as articulated in this essay was to do local organization work or write letters.  Id. at 612–13.  
Even though Wolfson’s strategy here involved “explaining why gay people should share, and be 
allowed to share, in the rights and responsibilities of marriage,” he situated this activity within the 
projects and goals of more organized social movements, not in dispersed families and neighborhoods; 
and it is not portrayed as the basis of change but as just one, ancillary part of it.   
304 Poirier, Microperformances of Identity, supra note 271, at 62 (discussing the already-known 
quality of the scripts about marriage deployed in the conversation strategy). 
305 See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on 
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L REV. 807 (1993) (enumerating some helpful aspects of legal storytelling, 
then critiquing its misuse); Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of 
Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845 (1994) (responding to critics of legal 
storytelling, including Farber and Sherry). 
306 Thanks to Bennett Klein of Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders for providing the 
plaintiffs’ affidavits to me. 
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They are typically quite brief, and they convey effectively the personal 
sense of urgency and intangible injury around marriage equality in a way 
that is compelling—compelling in a different and perhaps stronger way 
than abstract argument ever could be.  The Kerrigan opinions cite to the 
affidavits, as do various opinions to similar affidavits, in practically all the 
marriage equality cases.  It is the stories of the plaintiffs that shape the 
more abstract debate. 
The same is true in the Vermont and New Jersey investigations of the 
effectiveness of civil unions.307  Those reports are also replete with 
individual stories.  The short documentary film Freeheld also comes to 
mind.308  It told the story of police detective Lieutenant Laurel Hester of 
Ocean County, New Jersey, dying of cancer, who fought to have the Ocean 
County Board of Freeholders exercise its option under the New Jersey 
domestic partnership law then in force so that Hester’s long-time partner in 
life, Stacie André, could receive benefits upon Hester’s death.  Not only 
did personalization of the effects of the Board’s decision whether to accept 
domestic partnerships work for Hester and André—the film won an Oscar 
for best short documentary.  Professional advocates for marriage equality 
also are often especially effective and persuasive when they are narrating 
their own stories.309 
Recently Nancy Levit, in a speech assessing Martha Nussbaum’s 
recent work, pointed out the tension in the LGBT rights movement—the 
difficulty of telling stories about LGBT plaintiffs that will appeal to middle 
America without succumbing to a heteronormative bias.310  A follow-up 
conversation with Levit convinced me that the whole topic of the 
storytelling strategy of the marriage equality movement is worthy of 
academic study;311 and that the skillfully told stories like those in the 
                                                                                                                          
307 NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 16; VERMONT 2008 REPORT, supra note 16. 
308 FREEHELD: THE LAUREL HESTER STORY (Lieutenant Films 2006); see also Freeheld: The 
Laurel Hester Story, www.freeheld.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2009) (providing information about 
Freeheld). 
309 See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis When Considering 
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 
WIDENER L.J. 699, 702–06 (2004) (narrating the effect of Professor Cox’s marriage); Andrew Sullivan, 
My Big Fat Straight Wedding, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2008, at 17 (narrating the effect of Mr. Sullivan’s 
marriage). 
310 Nancy Levit, Comments at the Columbia Law School Symposium in Honor of Martha 
Nussbaum (Feb. 13, 2009).  See Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual 
Minorities, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1348687, at 10-13.  
311  See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, The State and 
Proposition 8, STAN. J. C.R. C.L. (forthcoming 2009) (analyzing the rhetoric in the Yes on 8 media 
spots in fall 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1381702.  A classic use of storytelling theory 
to describe a range of LGBT issues and politics is Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche 
Together?  Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992).  Levit’s remarks encouraged the presentation of more transgressive or 
queer stories as part of contemporary LGBTQ advocacy.  Fajer, writing a generation ago, when the 
overall political balance was quite different, recommended using stories of love, relationship, and 
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Kerrigan affidavits could profitably be published and shared widely with a 
general audience. 
A generation ago, Gerald Lopez pointed out that stock stories form a 
repertoire that a good lawyer needs to use to persuade.312  The 
“conversation” strategy is nothing but lay lawyering and choice among 
stock stories, top to bottom.  The names we use for ourselves in these 
stories are key, particularly names charged with history and honor, or 
names that are empty and susceptible of interpretation as a code for other 
names, bad names, or dishonorable names.  We need to consider seriously 
how the name “civil union” messes with our stock stories. 
IV.  THE “CIVIL UNION”/“MARRIAGE” DISTINCTION FOSTERS HARM 
WHEN APPLIED IN EVERYDAY SOCIAL PRACTICES OF NAMING AND 
RECOGNIZING FAMILIES 
A.  Once It Is Time to Give Same-Sex Relationships an Official Name 
Having said so much about naming as a diffuse social practice, we can 
now be somewhat briefer about the harm created by the Act.  It is a naming 
harm. 
The Civil Union Act sought to correct a prior practice of refusing to 
recognize same-sex relationships legally at all.  The legislature therefore 
had to decide what name to use for the same-sex couple status it sought 
legally to recognize.  Same-sex couples could no longer remain legally 
nameless.  To be sure, a certain kind of piecemeal recognition in 
Connecticut prior to 2005 had allowed the creation of rights regarding 
property, health care proxy, inheritance, children, etc., all without giving a 
unifying name to same-sex couples’ committed relationships.  At some 
point that kind of approach becomes awkward and seems to point towards 
a more wholesale recognition.313  The gestalt can change from a series of 
unconnected rights and obligations to a series of points which, understood 
to be connected, delineate a more organic view of the rights and 
obligations that inhere in LGBT identity. Moreover, inasmuch as part of 
the wholesale recognition process would likely involve some kind of 
formal ceremonial recognition of status, same-sex couples recognized by 
the state simply had to have a name. 
But what name?  The legislature could have established legal 
                                                                                                                          
family to counter a “sex-as-lifestyle” pre-understanding and stigma attached to gay men and lesbians.   
Id. at 546–70.  That is certainly what the marriage equality movement has tended to do, but to the 
exclusion from visibility and respectability of the more queer among us.  
312 Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984). 
313 See Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale, supra note 270, at 297–323 (discussing the piecemeal 
evolution of GLBT rights in New Jersey as a predicate to the potential for wholesale acceptance of such 
rights). 
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recognition by allowing same-sex couples to “marry.”314  Instead, the 
legislature decided to recognize same-sex couples by a different name. 
B.  The Problem of the Naming Distinction: Categorizing Couples as 
“Same-Sex” or “Opposite-Sex” is Widely Understood as “Gay” or 
“Straight,” and This Distinction, Against a Cultural Background of 
Stereotyping and Prejudice, Results in an Implied Stigma 
The point intuited by the Kerrigan court and other nomenclature 
opinions, though not always very clearly expressed, is that this official 
difference in naming works an ongoing harm, often trivial in any one 
instance but cumulatively problematic, because of the way that the new 
name, alongside the old one, will have effect in practice in everyday life.  
The availability of two different names will tend to force anyone involved 
in identifying or even thinking about a couple or family relationship to 
perform the distinction between same-sex and different-sex couples.  In 
any everyday interaction involving a couple (or one member of a couple or 
another family member), a person naming the couple or member will have 
to ask: “What name am I to use?  Is this one a ‘civil union’ or a 
‘marriage?’”315  They will have to consciously speak or write one way or 
another, acting on their knowledge about whether the couple is same-sex or 
different-sex.  (Or perhaps they will have to acknowledge, confronted with 
the choice of names, that they do not know but ought to, or perhaps the 
two-name structure will make them inquire.)  The diffuse naming behavior 
called for by the two-name structure will often, probably most of the time, 
remind the speaker, as well as everyone involved in recognizing the name, 
that a same-sex couple is likely gay or lesbian.  Moreover, that silent 
invocation of “gay or lesbian” will, more often than not, prompt the person 
doing the naming and anyone who hears the name to rehearse cognitively, 
often unconsciously, whatever associations they may have with “gay or 
lesbian.”316  These associations may be good or bad in any individual 
                                                                                                                          
314 To be sure, this would also have been a political stance.  No neutral position is available in the 
choice of names for a same-sex couple. 
315 In certain legal circumstances that question will be legally required.  In a much larger set of 
social circumstances, knowing that the couple may be legally recognized, it will likely be thought 
appropriate to ask, although there would be no legal penalty for using the same terminology for all 
couple relationships. 
316 As Kang & Banaji describe the process generally: 
Unconscious stereotypes, rooted in social categorization, are ubiquitous and 
chronically accessible.  They are automatically prompted by the mere presence 
of a target mapped into a particular social category.  Thus, when we see a Black 
(or a White) person, the attitude and stereotypes associated with that racial 
category automatically activate.  Further, these attitudes and stereotypes 
influence our judgments, as well as inhibit countertypical associations. 
Kang & Banaji, supra note 275, at 1084 (citations omitted).  Associations to LGBT folks may trigger a 
number of negative stereotypes and prejudices. In the context of same-sex couples, one can anticipate 
additional associations around sexual activity, often understood as non-normative or illicit or immoral; 
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instance.  But one can presume that, even in a relatively enlightened 
population like the citizens and residents of Connecticut,317 there will often 
be negative associations with the category of gay or lesbian, given the 
recent and widespread history of stereotyping, prejudice, and 
discrimination.  Stereotyping and prejudice undoubtedly continue to exist 
in the cognitive associations of many, many individuals within the state, 
and can be manifested in interactions that are as a practical matter beyond 
the purview of the state’s legal power. 
Put another way, establishing the separate name “civil union” 
interpellates in a certain way.  For one thing, it interpellates the members 
of a same-sex couple as gay or lesbian, with all that that identification may 
entail.  It does so indirectly, without using those names, simply because as 
a matter of social fact the separate name “civil union” will be understood 
as a proxy for gay or lesbian.  “Civil union” interpellates indirectly in 
another sense, and does so even when the members of a same-sex couple 
(or their relatives and friends) are not themselves immediately responding 
to a “hail.”  In the web of social understandings and relationships, the 
separate category “gay and lesbian” will be reinforced in all who must 
name family structures.  That means everyone.  Inserting the term “civil 
union” into social discourse interpellates everyone to continue to perform 
distinctions between heterosexual and gay/lesbian families, by naming and 
recognizing them differently. 
The state can well say, as it did in the Civil Union Act, that “civil 
union” is to be deemed the equivalent of “marriage” and that the other 
cognate kinship and ceremonial terms include civil union.318  That 
disclaimer is simply ineffective, given the way diffuse social practice 
works.  Establishing the distinction legally, so as to force everyone to 
recognize and maintain the distinction, will in itself reinforce pre-existing 
everyday social practices of categorization, and the cognitive structures 
                                                                                                                          
as well as around parenting stereotypes. 
317 These groups overlap, but not entirely.  I am getting at the ongoing cumulative and shared 
semiotic field produced by many microinteractions. A more accurate description of the relevant 
category, were it not so cumbersome and jargony, would be “all those who interact with one another 
around the process of identifying couples qua couples, and who collectively constitute and produce the 
ongoing cultural semiotic field of the State of Connecticut.” As I wrote recently elsewhere, “The core 
dynamics [of the Kulturkampf] are either local and place-based, or are universal and aterritorial, 
occurring at diffuse . . . levels of scale; and they all involve the discursive spaces within which we 
produce and reproduce tradition and identity.” Poirier, Identity Processes, supra note 271, at 391 
(footnote omitted).  Communities like Connecticut are imagined, though they are no less real because 
of that fact.  See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 2006). 
318 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38oo (2005) (“[W]herever in the general statutes the term ‘spouse’, 
‘family’, ‘immediate family’, ‘dependent family’, ‘next of kin’ or any other term that denotes the 
spousal relationship are used or defined, a party to a civil union relationship shall be included in such 
use or definition, and wherever in the general statutes . . . the term ‘marriage’ is used or defined, a civil 
union shall be included in such use or definition.”), held unconstitutional, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of 
Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
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that underlie them, including those harmful ones that are against the policy 
of the state and plausibly unconstitutional. 
Thomas Healy’s account of the working of stigmatic injury is helpful 
here in the mechanism it discerns for stigmatic injury.319  As a general 
background point, Healy argues that law both reflects and helps to shape 
social norms about stigmatized identity.320  “[I]t signals what behavior is 
appropriate toward certain groups.”321  There are several other effects as 
well.  Where the law results in physical segregation, it can make 
overcoming stigma more difficult.322  And the law can create categories 
that are used as the “basis for stigmatization.”323  Importantly, though, “law 
can also be used to combat stigma[,]”  because “when law removes its 
stamp of inferiority from stigmatized groups, society is likely to do the 
same.”324 
Healy identifies several types of harm from stigma, including the threat 
of discrimination,325 the actual experience of discrimination,326 the threat of 
loss of self-esteem,327 and the internalization of negative stereotypes by the 
stigmatized, who then behave differently—the so-called “stereotype 
threat.”328  Summarizing these types of injury, Healy argues that those who 
are in a stigmatized identity category are injured “because the 
government’s action brands them with a mark of disgrace that invites 
discrimination and prejudice against them, threatens their self-esteem, and 
makes them vulnerable to stereotype threats and self-fulfilling 
prophecies.”329 
Healy also argues persuasively that where a group is already 
stigmatized government action can add to the injury: 
                                                                                                                          
319 Healy, supra note 35. 
320 See, e.g., id. at 451 (discussing the interplay of law and stigma). 
321 Id. at 452. 
322 E.g., id. (“[W]hen law requires or permits segregation of stigmatized groups, it makes it more 
difficult for those groups to overcome the stereotypes that help to generate their stigma.”). 
323 Id. 
324 Id. at 452–53. 
325 Id. at 453–54 (“[B]ecause the stigmatized are marked as less than fully human, they face the 
‘ever-present possibility’ that they will be the targets of prejudice and discrimination.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
326 Id. at 454 (“[D]iscrimination makes it harder for the stigmatized to obtain employment, 
housing, education, and to develop lasting relationships with others.”). 
327 Id. at 454–56 (discussing the mechanisms of loss of self-esteem). 
328 Id. at 456–58 (discussing the internalization and self-fulfilling prophecy victims of 
stigmatization may experience).  On stereotype threat and intellectual performance, see, for example, 
Kang & Banaji, supra note 275, at 1087–90 (discussing evidence of stereotype threat as well as 
“stereotype boost” to positively-stereotyped minorities and “stereotype lift” to those in competition 
with negatively stereotyped minorities).  Basically, “arbitrary environmental cues can trigger implicit 
cognitive processes that interfere or facilitate performance on seemingly objective measures.”  Id. at 
1089.   
329 Healy, supra note 35, at 461.  Healy’s discussion is informed by the work of Erving Goffman 
on stigma and interactions.  Id. at 422 & n.29, 449, 454 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON 
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963)). 
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By reinforcing the social belief that those with a particular 
trait are discredited, the government adds to the prejudice and 
discrimination against them, creates additional threats to their 
self-esteem, and reaffirms the stereotypes that lead to self-
fulfilling prophecies.  The government’s role also likely 
increases the intensity of these harms, particularly the threat 
to self-esteem.330 
Healy contends that the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,331 in 
deciding to reach the due process issue presented to it and to overrule 
Bowers v. Hardwick,332 indicated the availability of stigmatic harm as a 
constitutionally cognizable injury.333  Healy’s point about Lawrence is 
correct, though it requires some fine-tuning when the stigmatizing law is a 
naming statute rather than a criminal one.  It is not enough to note that 
Lawrence and the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction both involve 
homosexuality, though historic stereotyping and prejudice around 
homosexuality is the underlying context for the stigmatic injury in both 
instances.  The Lawrence opinion defines the stigmatic harm in terms of a 
kind of penumbra from the moral taint of criminalization.334  Moreover, the 
Court points out, the stigmatic harm from criminalization “is not trivial.”335  
In the context of “civil union” the argument is slightly more complex.  The 
mere fact of a nomenclature distinction allows the underlying stigmatized 
category of homosexual to remain more active in social and legal 
microinteractions than if the name “marriage” had been adopted for all 
couples.  And because the name for the family unit must be deployed day 
in and day out, the reactivation of underlying cognitive biases is likely to 
be constant.336 
                                                                                                                          
330 Id. at 464. 
331 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
332 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
333 Healy, supra note 35, at 438–41.  
334 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575: 
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains 
unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were 
not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.  When homosexual 
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of 
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in 
the public and in the private spheres. 
335 Id. 
336 The practice of routinely categorizing individuals and couples in daily life according to 
whether they are in same-sex or different-sex relationships seems to me somewhat different from the 
notion that criminalization conveys a message of stigma. The naming process occurs more frequently 
and in a wider variety of contexts than the act of identifying sodomy as criminal.  To be sure, scholars 
have argued that identifying same-sex couples qua couples will often trigger associations to same-sex 
sex.  See, e.g., Mary Ann Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal 
History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1643–45, 1658–63 (1993) 
(discussing associations between same-sex couples and same-sex sex and the negative implications of 
this association in different social contexts); Fajer, supra note 311, at 516, 538–46 (discussing what he 
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Healy’s analysis of stigmatic injury resonates with a germinal work by 
Charles Lawrence, the important 1987 article The Id, the Ego and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.337  Lawrence’s article 
was a response to the doctrine of discriminatory purpose established for 
purposes of federal constitutional civil rights law in Washington v. 
Davis.338  Lawrence argued that “the injury of racial inequality exists 
irrespective of the decision maker’s motives.”339  He proposed a different 
way of thinking about racism, one “that more accurately describes both its 
origins and the nature of the injury that it inflicts.”340  Lawrence focused on 
shared ideas, attitudes, and beliefs, the racist content of which we may well 
be unaware.341  These ideas are part of the culture which we inherit342 and 
which we in turn reproduce.  Lawrence argued that racism is culturally 
“transmitted by tacit understandings.”343  Focusing on intent thus ignores 
much of what we know about the workings of racism.  If we wish to 
eradicate racism, Lawrence argued, we must “recognize racism’s primary 
source.”344  Focusing on “cultural symbols that have racial meaning,”  
Lawrence recommended a “cultural meaning” test for government action—
governmental action should be evaluated “to determine whether it conveys 
a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance.”345  If 
so, it would receive strict scrutiny in the courts. 
Professor Lawrence also elaborated on a theory of equal protection as a 
right to be free from stigma.346  Stigma involves labeling a group as 
inferior in a way that shames and degrades that group’s members.347  
Stigma involves a whole “social system of laws, practices, and cultural 
mores . . . .”348  It injures in two ways, according to Lawrence: by inflicting 
psychological injury on the individual’s dignity and self-respect, and by 
branding the individual in a way that affects others’ respect for and 
                                                                                                                          
calls the “sex-as-lifestyle assumption,” which reduces gay men and lesbians to an imputed focus on 
sexual activity).  Criminalization for sexual conduct conveys stigma, as does an attribution of obsessive 
focus on sexuality.  The two stigmatic insults are related, but not quite the same. 
337 Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, supra note 131, at 318.  Indeed, Healy relies on Lawrence’s work.  
Healy, supra note 35, at 467–68. 
338 Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, supra note 131, at 318 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976)). 
339 Id. at 319. 
340 Id. at 321. 
341 Id. at 322. 
342 Id. at 323. 
343 Id. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. at 324. 
346 Id. at 349–55.  Lawrence relied expressly on Kenneth Karst’s theory of equal protection.  Id. at 
350 n.141 (citing inter alia Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship, supra note 36, and Kenneth L. Karst, 
Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983)).  He also expressly noted Karst’s acknowledgement 
of Erving Goffman’s work on stigma.  Id. at 350 n.143 (noting Karst’s reliance on GOFFMAN, supra 
note 329, at 1–9)). 
347 Id. at 350. 
348 Id. 
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interaction with her.349  The injury of stigmatization is cumulative.350  
Moreover, stigma is “self-perpetuating.”351 
Stigma is at its heart a symbolic injury.352  But symbols usually don’t 
have inherent meaning.  They are interpreted only in light of a cultural 
tradition which gives them their negative understanding and thus creates 
the injury.  As Lawrence explains: “[I]n most cases the symbol is not 
inherently pejorative.  Rather, the message obtains its shameful meaning 
from the historical and cultural context in which it is used and, ultimately, 
from the way it is interpreted by those who witness it.”353  “[S]tigmatizing 
actions injure by virtue of the meaning society gives them . . . .”354  Intent 
is not necessary to infliction of the injury.355  But an understanding of the 
cultural meaning of symbols attached by law to groups is essential. 
The symbolic action at issue in one classic pronouncement of stigmatic 
injury was school segregation.  Brown v. Board of Education held that 
even where physical facilities and other tangible factors are equal, 
segregating schoolchildren “solely because of their race generates a feeling 
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”356  Therefore, the Court 
held, “Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”357  This 
holding was limited to public education in the Brown case itself,358 but it 
has been applied to other kinds of segregation, and is the basis for a sense 
of equal citizenship that some argue is of constitutional scope under the 
Equal Protection Clause.359  The harm—or at least the intangible harm, 
                                                                                                                          
349 Id. at 351. 
350 “[S]eparate incidents of racial stigmatization do not inflict isolated injuries but are part of a 
mutually reinforcing and pervasive pattern of stigmatizing actions that cumulate to compose an 
injurious whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.”  Id. at 351. 
351 Id. 
352 “The injury of stigmatization consists of forcing the injured individual to wear a badge or 




356 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
357 Id. at 495. 
358 Id. 
359 See, e.g., KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36 (developing a theory of equal 
citizenship that is protected by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Karst, 
Foreword: Equal Citizenship, supra note 36 (same).   
One of the classic follow-on statements about the stigma of separate categories apart from any 
tangible harm may not help as much as its frequent citation might suggest.  Heckler v. Mathews 
contains broad language about the stigma of categorization; the Court wrote:  
[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating “archaic and stereotypic notions” or by 
stigmatizing members of a disfavored group as “innately inferior” and therefore as 
less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious non-economic 
injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because 
of their membership in the disfavored group.   
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984) (citations and footnote omitted).  But this case was 
about economic discrimination against men in the context of government retirement benefits.  Not 
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where it coexists with tangible harm—of segregation comes not from the 
physical separation but from the act of separating folks into two classes 
based on race. 
Now consider the Kerrigan case.  The naming or labeling at stake in 
the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction has nothing of physical 
segregation about it in the sense of the placing of live bodies in one 
location versus another.  But it involves an important, if intangible 
institution—the family and its name—and authorizes (and in legal contexts 
requires) a linguistic sorting of couples and their families.  The labeling 
distinction is about exclusion from the use of an important intangible 
institution.360  Underneath the ostensibly neutral label of “civil union” lies 
another category, which will be widely understood. 
The Kerrigan court cites Brown v. Board, as it should have.361  Equally 
important, in my view, is the court’s citation to a Connecticut case, 
Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women.362  That case 
involved help-wanted advertisements that had been sorted by the 
publishing newspapers into men only, women only, and either men or 
women.363  Citing to the “no such thing as separate but equal” principle of 
Brown v. Board, the court in Evening Sentinel held that “segregating 
employment opportunities advertisements into racial, religious, age, 
national origin or ancestry or sex classifications constitutes 
discrimination.”364  The newspaper therefore could not, acting on its own, 
engage in this kind of impermissible sorting; to do so was “aiding and 
abetting” advertisers and employers, prohibited under the statute.365  Actual 
physical segregation or exclusion was not at issue; moreover, no job was 
actually denied on account of sex.  This case was about a classification 
harm.  It was a matter of “[s]ymbolic discrimination.”366  The separately 
labeled help-wanted ads could reinforce the actions of others in separating 
jobs into different kinds for men and women and, concurrently, reinforce 
conceptions of men and women as suitable for different kinds of job 
                                                                                                                          
exactly your typical stigmatized group.  Healy argues that the problem in the case was really one of an 
underinclusive statute, as to which Congress had provided in advance that any attempt to challenge the 
underinclusiveness would be remedied by leveling down.  Thus it would appear that any lawsuit for 
underinclusiveness could be met with a standing challenge, as no remedy would be available under the 
terms of the statute itself.  The statement about intangible stigmatic injury was, according to Healy, a 
way of getting the plaintiff standing to challenge a statute that otherwise might have been 
unreviewable.  Healy, supra note 35, at 433. 
360 See generally Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 4, at 362–66 (using language of access 
and exclusion and similar property rhetoric as an entry into discussion of traditionalist concern about 
misuse of the institution of marriage by same-sex couples). 
361 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008) (citing Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
362 Id. (citing Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 357 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1975)). 
363 Evening Sentinel, 357 A.2d at 501. 
364 Id. 
365 Id. at 502. 
366 Id. at 504. 
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opportunities—thus perpetuating stereotypes as well as limiting actual 
opportunities for women.367  Although the court in Evening Sentinel did not 
use this language, the case was about a kind of stigmatic injury.  The court 
also had to interpret the exclusionary classification against a cultural and 
historical background.  It noted a contemporary policy in the state of 
Connecticut to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women,368 and 
noted that the act at issue addressed “subtle” as well as overt 
discrimination.369  The statute therefore prohibited not only exclusion from 
jobs but “practices leading to and facilitating such discrimination.”370 
The establishment of two separate names for a basic family structure is 
very much like the establishment of separate listings for jobs for men and 
women. It does not in itself say anything explicitly prejudicial.  But it will 
be read against a history of prejudice. Also, it forces those seeking to alter 
the underlying important social structure (families or jobs, as the case may 
be) to proceed through the use of categories that have pernicious effects 
that the state is clearly committed to countering.  Just as the separate job 
listings were read by the Connecticut Supreme Court to cause harm 
through symbolic discrimination, the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction 
read in context aids and abets a cognizable constitutional injury.  Evening 
Sentinel, then, should be taken not just as part of a string cite, but as a 
helpful gloss on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s reasoning on cognizable 
injury in Kerrigan. 
Once a distinction is established, the processes of stereotyping and 
prejudice unfold as of themselves.  For this reason, it seems to me, impact 
rather than intent is key in understanding the injury in the Civil Union Act.  
Inquiring into what the legislature intended by establishing a distinct term 
“civil union” is not relevant.  Once the legislature establishes the term 
“civil union,” it is how the term will work in everyday life that matters.  
This insight may help us address the concern that no invidious intent had 
been shown (the concern voiced by the dissenting justices in Kerrigan), 
and that only discriminatory purpose would rise to the level of 
constitutional injury.371  The Kerrigan majority did not explain this as 
                                                                                                                          
367 As the court wrote, “The very act of classifying individuals by means of criteria irrelevant to 
the ultimate end sought to be accomplished operates in a discriminatory manner. Such discrimination is 
destructive to society as a whole in that it eliminates a class of individuals who otherwise could have 
made vital and fresh contributions.”  Id. 
368 Id. at 503–04. 
369 Id. at 504.  Interestingly, Professor Lawrence provides an example of physical segregation of 
men and women in which the cultural background meaning would be exculpatory.  Whereas racial 
segregation of restrooms would be read in a context of stigma, segregation of restrooms by sex would 
not.  See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, supra note 131, at 351–52 (noting that segregation of men and 
women in the restroom context is socially acceptable while segregating individuals by race is not); see 
also Healy, supra note 35, at 467–68 (discussing Lawrence’s restroom example). 
370 Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 357 A.2d 498, 504 (Conn. 1975). 
371 Justice Borden objects that there has been no intent to discriminate or stigmatize.  Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 514 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting).  Justice Zarella 
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clearly as it could have.372 
Nor does the fact that the term “civil union” has no history mean it 
cannot possibly be a source of harm, as Justice Borden would have it.373  It 
is inserted into a rich history of family and kinship naming, a cipher that 
must be spoken in conjunction with a distinction (gay-straight) with 
widespread and harmful associations in the recent past. It simply is not 
neutral.  The distinction itself will reinforce underlying stereotypes 
associated with gay and lesbian individuals and couples.  No factual 
inquiry is needed here. 
Some courts addressing the nomenclature issue have discerned an 
injury in “civil union” or “domestic partner” because its use forces 
members of such a relationship to disclose that they are gay or lesbian 
when they would prefer not to.374  That is certainly a harm of the 
information privacy sort (though not one addressed separately by the 
Kerrigan court).  But that separate issue of control of disclosure of 
personal information does not address the generic harm that is perpetrated 
by the establishment of differential legal kinship names society-wide.  
Consider the “Miss”/“Mrs.” harm.  It is not about disclosure of private fact 
as such—marital status is always public somewhere.375  The concern is 
rather that the “Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction reinforces and makes more 
                                                                                                                          
makes a similar argument.  See id. at 521–23 (Zarella, J., dissenting) (noting that the “driving force 
behind the development of traditional marriage” between a man and a woman was not intentionally 
discriminatory toward gay and lesbian individuals).  The Kerrigan majority looks at disparate treatment 
alone.  Id. at 412.  The Act “directly classif[ies] and prescrib[es] distinct treatment on the basis of 
sexual orientation” and “operate[s] clearly and directly to impose different treatment on gay individuals 
because of their sexual orientation.”  Id. at 431 n.24. 
372 It is centrally relevant that gay persons are “a minority group that continues to suffer the 
enduring effects of centuries of legally sanctioned discrimination . . . .”  Id. at 432.  But it is not quite 
accurate to say that “laws singling [gay persons] out for disparate treatment are subject to heightened 
judicial scrutiny to ensure that those laws are not the product of such historical prejudice and 
stereotyping.”  Id.  This is a vestigial intent theory reemerging.  Here, the court seems to think that it 
should be looking to what produced the law, rather than to what kind of effects the law is likely to 
produce, based on social fact and cultural meaning. 
373 “At this point in our state’s history . . . and without appropriate fact-finding on the issue, I am 
unable to say that [civil union] is widely considered to be less than or inferior to marriage, or that it 
does not bring with it the same social recognition as marriage.  It is simply too early to know this with 
any reasonable measure of certitude.”  Id. at 486 (Borden, J., dissenting). 
374 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008) (discussing an additional 
privacy harm in forcing disclosure of same-sex couple status, without linking this harm to the opinion’s 
underlying analysis of constitutional injury). 
375 To be sure, in contrast to public records of marriages, we do not maintain an official register of 
who is gay or lesbian.  But there is widespread disclosure where same-sex couples are concerned.  
Inevitably, various visible or linguistic markers for those in a same-sex relationship make likely 
homosexuality evident, regardless of whether a speaker ever uses the terms “civil union” or “marriage.”  
These might include the visible presence of a same-sex partner, or a pronoun reference to “he” or 
“she,” or other indicators such as photographs or clothing, which will disclose same-sex couple status 
and thus allow others to infer homosexuality.  See generally Fajer, supra note 311; Poirier, 
Microperformances of Identity, supra note 271, at 14–15 (discussing the way in which visible same-sex 
couples communicate identity traits around sex, gender, and sexual orientation and disrupt normal 
performances of these categories). 
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legitimate in everyday life the distinction between married and unmarried 
women, as well as problematic cognitive associations related to that 
distinction.  The “Miss”/“Mrs.” distinction reproduces a sorting and 
labeling of women.  
Consider the alternatives that a legislature must address when it 
reaches the point of deciding to legally recognize same-sex couples.  If a 
state eschews “civil union” or some other word, and uses “marriage” and 
its cognates in a way that encompasses same-sex couples, that will not 
immediately change most of everyday practice.  On various social levels 
many people and civic institutions (some churches, for example) will still 
withhold the name marriage.  Moreover, given that same-sex couples will 
still be visible as same-sex couples in everyday life (and identifiable 
audibly/linguistically too, as soon as a same-gender pronoun is used), the 
inference of homosexuality will still occur in many circumstances even if 
the legal relationship is called “marriage.”376  But if the name “marriage” 
also applies to same-sex couples, inquiring into same-sex/different sex and 
speaking differentially in light of that fact will not be legally required.  On 
a social level, if the different name “civil union” is not authorized, the 
name “marriage” for same-sex unions is likely to gain hold significantly 
more quickly in common parlance.  Even though resistance to it is likely to 
persist for a long time (especially given the fierce adherence of some 
traditionalists and civic institutions to a particular conception of 
“marriage”), naming practices will tend to change faster overall.  Also, the 
intangible harm of social non-recognition (an intangible harm which I have 
not addressed in this Article) is likely to be addressed more quickly where 
a new term “civil union” does not stand in the way of changing the 
everyday usages of “marriage” to include legally recognized same-sex 
couples.  And that in turn may facilitate more widespread legal 
recognition, as a matter of interstate comity or eventually in formal change 
at higher levels of government. 
C. Constitutional Injury through Exclusion When the Government 
Recognizes One Group with Special Honor  
So far, I have focused on the fact that the differential naming approach 
will result in categorization, which will which cause individuals to 
associate “civil union” with “gay or lesbian” and whatever else that may be 
                                                                                                                          
376 In fact, that is one reason why I think that allowing same-sex couples to marry probably will, 
in the long run, alter the gendered nature of traditional marriage.  The everyday microperformances of 
married status by same-gender couples will consistently trouble the diffuse expectation that a 
prototypical married couple will be opposite gender.  Compare Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and 
Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 18–19 (1991) (arguing that gay and lesbian 
marriage will alter the gendered structure of marriage), with Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We 
Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of 
Gender in Every Marriage”, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536–37 (1993) (disagreeing with Hunter). 
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associated with in each individual’s cognitive structures.  The other half of 
the equation in the Kerrigan opinion is the fact that “marriage,” in all its 
splendor, has a long and honored history.  Calling a same-sex couple’s 
relationship by the name “civil union” withholds that traditionally honored 
and recognized status from those couples and their families.  Is this a 
separate kind of stigmatic injury, and if so, is it of constitutional 
dimension?  Thomas Healy discerns, among the indicia of standing for 
stigmatic injury in federal court cases, that this kind of honor/no 
recognition pair has been understood to be of constitutional dimension, in 
particular in the subset of Establishment Clause cases involving religious 
displays.377  But what, after all, is the harm in honoring one religion’s 
tradition in a public display, and not another religion’s tradition in the 
same way? 
In her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, a religious display case 
involving a Nativity crèche, Justice O’Connor wrote that governmentally-
sponsored religious displays would make nonadherents feel that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and would send a 
message to adherents that they are insiders and favored members of the 
community.378  We can generalize this principle of non-endorsement, and 
see the underlying structure of such an injury in governmental action that 
gives special recognition to one group and not to another, particularly in 
centrally important and status-conferring social categories.379  The injury 
concerns the use of what Kenneth Karst calls “symbols of inclusion and 
exclusion.”380  The religious display cases involve one basic identity 
category—religion—and hold that the government may not endorse one 
religion and withhold endorsement from another.381  Arguably, the 
identification as a legitimate family is equally central to social status, and 
the elevation of different-sex families and implicit lesser status of same-sex 
families in that arena is an injury of the same kind.  As Karst writes, “the 
government’s message of exclusion is itself a stigmatic harm, and an 
                                                                                                                          
377 Healy, supra note 35, at 436–38. 
378 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (involving the 
display of a Nativity scene by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island).  Justice O’Connor reiterated this 
analysis the following term in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(involving a “moment of silence” in public schools).  This endorsement test was essentially adopted by 
a majority of justices in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595–99 (1989) (applying to 
public displays of a crèche and of a menorah next to a Christmas tree the endorsement test from 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch); id. at 623–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (articulating and applying 
the endorsement test from her Lynch concurrence). 
379 Jack Balkin observes that Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” test is about status categories; it 
“prohibit[s] certain government actions that raise the status of some social groups at the expense of 
others.”  Balkin, supra note 247, at 2349 n.109.  Balkin also notes that the injury here is a 
communication by the state of inferior group status, and bears a close relationship to Charles 
Lawrence’s argument about “cultural meaning”.  Id. (discussing the O’Connor endorsement test in light 
of Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, supra note 131). 
380 Karst, The First Amendment, supra note 38, at 512, 519.  
381 Id. at 512. 
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unconstitutional denial of full membership in the community.”382  In the 
one instance, the problem is displaying a religious symbol, which conveys 
honor to one group above others.  In the other, the problem is reserving the 
name marriage for opposite-sex couples, which effectively conveys the 
honored status of marriage on one group above the other.  In its analysis of 
the difference between “marriage” and “civil union,” the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court specifically called it a “stigma of exclusion.”383   
Professor Karst has developed this idea of the stigmatic injury of 
symbolic exclusion into a broad theory of equal citizenship and belonging 
rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment.384 He describes the principle of equal 
citizenship as follows: 
Each individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the 
organized society as a respected, responsible, and 
participating member. Stated negatively, the principle forbids 
the organized society to treat an individual as a member of an 
inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant.  The 
principle thus centers on those aspects of equality that are 
most closely bound to the sense of self and the sense of 
                                                                                                                          
382 Karst, Justice O’Connor, supra note 37, at 371.   
This type of injury has also come to be known as “expressive harm”.  See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil, 
Expressivism, Empathy, and Equality, 36 MICH. J. L. REF. 247, 252–53, 254–75 (2003) (tracing the 
doctrinal and theoretical history from early stigma cases, through reliance on intent, through the 
reemergence of stigma and expressive harm tests and theories).  In a major theoretical article on 
expressive harm, Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes argue that Equal Protection and Establishment 
Clause cases are the most often discussed bases for a constitutional theory of expressive harm.  
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1532 (2000).  Equal Protection may be concerned with the expression of 
“contempt, hostility, or inappropriate paternalism towards racial, ethnic, gender, and certain other 
classifications, or that constitute them as social inferiors or as a stigmatized pariah class.”  Id. at 1533.  
But it may also address inappropriate recognition—“laws that, by giving too much weight to a suspect 
class, express a divisive conception of citizens—a conception that represents their racial, ethnic, 
religious, or other parochial identities as more important than their common identity as citizens of the 
United States.”  Id. at 1533–34.   Moreover, while there are multiple functions to Establishment Clause 
doctrine, Anderson and Pildes conclude that “[e]xpressivist analysis properly dominates the parts of 
Establishment doctrine that perform the same function for religious differences among citizens that 
Equal Protection doctrine performs for racial and ethnic differences among citizens.”  Id. at 1550.   
383 The court writes: “The bill would have the effect of maintaining and fostering a stigma of 
exclusion that the Constitution prohibits.  It would deny to same-sex spouses only a status that is 
specially recognized in society and has significant social and other advantages.”  In re Opinions of the 
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004). 
384 See, e.g., KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36; Karst, Why Equality Matters, supra 
note 346; Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship, supra note 36; see also Balkin, supra note 247, at 2343–
44 (arguing that “[t]he constitution has an egalitarian demand . . . for equality of social status. . . that 
exists even though it cannot be achieved by legal means alone[,]” and that this demand is “the deep 
meaning of the American political experience.”); Poirier, Gender, Place, supra note 271, at 336–39 
(discussing the notion of equal citizenship in the context of a tiered account of the praxis of exclusion 
and inclusion, with specific incidents of exclusion at the bottom level, broad concepts of inclusion and 
citizenship at the top, and specific legal doctrines of various sorts mediating between them).  
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inclusion in a community.385 
The school desegregation cases and public accommodation desegregation 
cases were about claims to equal citizenship, Karst asserts.386 But “neither 
the [Fourteenth A]mendment’s declaration of citizenship nor its equal 
protection clause is limited to the subject of race.”387  “It was the claim of 
equal citizenship that informed the first manifesto to issue from the 
American women’s movement . . . .”388  Karst also argues that Bowers v. 
Hardwick should have approached the issue of the constitutionality of 
sodomy laws as one of stigma and exclusion.389  One of the five 
“illustrative cases” Karst uses to introduce his idea of equal citizenship as 
belonging is, precisely, the crèche display in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, that 
was the subject of Lynch v. Donnelly.390 
The “endorsement” test from the religious display cases is helpful in 
elucidating the status harm in the “civil union”/“marriage” distinction.  For 
these cases depend entirely on whether the state has acted to elevate one 
group, and not at all on whether the state has acted to disparage another 
group.  As Jack Balkin points out, “the test does not require any deliberate 
attempt to degrade or harm; the mere effect of endorsement as judged by a 
reasonable observer is sufficient.”391  Justice Borden’s concern in his 
Kerrigan dissent about what “civil union” means simple drops out as part 
of the analysis.  The Civil Union Act grants the honored name, status, and 
                                                                                                                          
385 KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36, at 3.  In this broad reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Karst expressly disagrees with the central cases of the second half of the nineteenth 
century which limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 57–61.  Jack Balkin, making a 
parallel argument about a broad concept of equal citizenship, relies on a number of “status-
disestablishing clauses” in the constitution.  Balkin, supra note 247, at 2346–53. 
Anderson & Pildes identify the same broad underlying issues of citizen respect, participation, and 
membership as Karst does.  Under the principle of expressive harm, “State action must express ‘equal 
concern and respect’ for all persons. . . .” Anderson & Pildes, supra note 382, at 1520 (quoting 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977)).  And state action “must express a 
collective understanding of all citizens as equal members of the State . . . notwithstanding their racial, 
ethnic, or religious differences.”  Id. 
386 KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 36, at 4.  Brown v. Board of Education, 374 U.S. 
483 (1954), is a “leitmotif” in Karst’s book.  Id. at 14.  Brown v. Board depended on identifying the 
harm of a sense of inferiority created by state-sponsored exclusion, and Karst asserts that within a few 
years this case became the key citation for this principle, although often without explanation.  Id. at 18–
19.  Indeed, Karst describes instances of segregation as effectively “degradation ceremonies.”  Id. at 4 
(referring to Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. 
SOCIOLOGY 420 (1956)). 
387 Id. at 4. 
388 Id. at 111 (discussing the Declaration of Sentiments adopted in Seneca Falls, New York, in 
1848). 
389 Id. at 204–06 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).  In addition to criminalization of sodomy, Karst identifies the other 
principal form of exclusion from citizenship of gays and lesbians as the issue of military service and 
security clearance.  Id. at 208.  Karst was writing before the political developments of the 1990s opened 
up the possibility of same-sex couple and family recognition and made the longstanding practices of 
exclusion in those areas widely visible and contestable. 
390 Id. at 8–9 (discussing Lynch v. Donnelly, 468 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
391 Balkin, supra note 247, at 2349 n.109. 
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kinship of “marriage” to some legally-recognized couples but not to all of 
them.  To be sure, what constitutes an endorsement, as opposed to say an 
instructive historical display, is the subject of ongoing controversy and 
sometimes fine distinctions.392  But in the case of a legislature reserving 
“marriage” for opposite-sex couples, the intentional elevation of these 
couples through use of the name “marriage” and the simultaneous 
exclusion of same-sex couples from similar honor through the use of some 
other name, couldn’t be clearer.  Karst offers a theory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that elaborates from our country’s cultural underpinnings as 
well as case law, in just the way Robert Leckey recommends.393  It 
expresses well a set of constitutional values that focus on equal citizenship 
and belonging.  The Connecticut Supreme Court, interpreting the state 
constitution, can be understood to apply the same touchstone of 
constitutional principle to the elevation of one group but not another.  
V.  RECAPITULATION: NAME CALLING AND IDENTIFYING STIGMA 
The title of this Article is deliberately ambiguous, in fact doubly so.  It 
relies on ambiguities in English grammar around verb forms ending in 
“ing.”  “Name calling” could be about someone calling out bad names—in 
this case, possibly, the implicit stigma associated with the Connecticut 
legislature’s refusal to use the word “marriage” officially for same-sex 
couples, prescribing “civil union” instead.  “Civil union” does not 
explicitly insult same sex couples, to be sure.  But the Civil Union Act 
deliberately withholds the unique name “marriage,” which confers favored 
identity, normal status, and easily recognized kinship forms.  This 
withholding could be understood as an insult from the legislature, albeit a 
discreet one.  
“Name calling” is also potentially a shorthand for the phenomenon of 
interpellation.394  Against a background of a history of stigma, 
discrimination, and second-class (or worse) treatment of gay and lesbian 
folk, the withholding of “marriage” and its replacement by a neologism—
“civil union”—facilitate the continued interpellation of gay and lesbian 
couples, their families and, in a different way, all those who must interact 
                                                                                                                          
392 Compare McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 
844 (2005) (finding display of Ten Commandments at county courthouses, as part of a larger display, 
to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion, in light of past history of the county’s attempts to 
display Ten Commandments, which indicated a religious purpose to the display), with Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (finding display of Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds 
not to be an establishment of religion).  As Balkin points out, the endorsement test, like Charles 
Lawrence’s cultural meaning test, requires courts “to investigate the cultural meaning of government 
action to determine if an injury to status has occurred;” disagreements will be inevitable.  Balkin, supra 
note 247, at 2349 n.109. 
393 Leckey, supra note 14, at 465–74. 
394 See supra Part III.B (discussing Althusser’s theory of interpellation and its relation to name-
calling). 
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with them as couples.  This interpellation occurs because of preexisting, 
stigmatizing practices and names, which persist to some considerable 
extent in Connecticut—the territorial jurisdiction at issue—as well as in 
wider society.  Because “marriage” has a tradition, history, and culture, 
and “civil union” does not, the diffuse social practices around identifying 
and stigmatizing gays and lesbians (singly and as couples) are allowed 
more room to perpetuate themselves than if legal same-sex unions had 
been formally legally labeled “marriage.”  “Civil union” is effectively a 
blank slate, and in the absence of a name that will call up our inherited 
associations to “marriage” for same-sex couples—and only “marriage” will 
do that—we are able to hear other names, other insults, still calling. 
“Identifying stigma” in the Article’s title is also ambiguous.  The 
Article agrees with and expands upon what the Connecticut Supreme Court 
majority did: it identified stigma lurking behind the neologism “civil 
union.”  Justice Borden, arguing in dissent that a word without history 
could not be an insult, is just wrong, though other judges have said the 
same.  The Kerrigan majority was justified here by relying on obvious 
cultural meaning and social fact to recognize the persistent vestiges of a 
longstanding practice of subordination and prejudice. 
This Article has suggested that the reason the court is able to identify 
stigma in “civil union” is precisely because the distinction will evoke 
stigma in the process of everyday identifications—the repeated naming--of 
a fundamental kinship form.  The “civil union”/“marriage” distinction 
forces or encourages everyone, across a wide spectrum of interpersonal 
interactions, to engage in repeated acts of cognitively identifying same-sex 
couples as distinct from married different-sex couples.  In these 
interactions, traditional stigmatization and second-class (or worse) views 
of homosexuals will inevitably come to mind.  These may or may not be 
reenacted in any given instance, but they will be recalled, often 
unconsciously, and sometimes they will be reenacted.  Requiring same-sex 
couples to be named differently thus tends to perpetuate some of the 
historical practice of stigmatizing them.  The Act’s purported guarantee of 
equal treatment legally is well and good, but it simply fails to come to 
terms with the everyday social and cultural practices and the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying them, in which names for kinship categories are 
applied and identities are recognized and (re)produced.  Requiring a 
different name for same-sex couples produces an identifying stigma. 
 
